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On December 13, 2019, 49-year-
old Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Constable Allan Poapst 
was killed while on duty. He 
was travelling westbound on 
the Perimeter Highway in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba when a 
p ickup t ruck t ravel l ing 
eastbound crossed the median 
and collided with Constable  Poapst’s RCMP 
vehicle. Constable Poapst was pronounced 
deceased at the scene. The driver and passenger 
in the pickup truck were transported to hospital 
with injuries. 
Constable Poapst was the proud father of three 
teenaged girls and five days away from serving 
13 years with the RCMP. He was an avid fan of 
the Winnipeg Blue Bombers and the Winnipeg 
Jets.
“Allan is gone, but he will 
never be forgotten by the 
many officers who worked by 
his side and by the people of 
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Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is March 13, 2020.
Attend the next information session 
on January 9, 2020.
Bachelor of Law Enforcement Studies
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you have a relevant diploma or 
associate  degree and are interested in obtaining an 
applied degree to pursue a law enforcement or 
public safety career, then this program is for you.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is April 30, 2020.
Attend the next information session 
on January 9, 2020.
Tactical Criminal Analysis
The graduate certificate in Tactical Criminal Analysis 
is a 15 credit program (five 3-credit courses 
delivered online) which will provide an advanced 
level theoretical and applied framework for the 
study of criminal intelligence and analysis, and its 
application in a  wide variety of law enforcement 
contexts.
Now accepting applications for September 2020.
Application deadline is on May 8, 2020
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN THE 
LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The art of statistics: learning from data.
David Spiegelhalter.
London, UK: Pelican, an imprint of Penguin Books, 
2019.
HA 29 S654 2019
Bounce back: how to fail fast and be resilient at 
work.
Susan Kahn.
New York, NY: Kogan Page, 2020.
HF 5381 K324 2019
Business writing today: a practical guide.
Natalie Canavor.
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2019.
HF 5718.3 C365 2019
Conceptual blockbusting: a guide to better ideas.
James L. Adams.
New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019.
BF 449 A25 2019
Fentanyl, Inc.: how rogue chemists are creating 
the deadliest wave of the opioid epidemic.
Ben Westhoff.
New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2019.
RC 568 O45 W47 2019
Guide to effective committees for directors of 
not-for-profit organizations.
Sandi L. Humphrey, CAE.
Toronto, ON: Canadian Society of Association 
Executives, 2017.
HD 62.6 H86 2017
The introverted leader: building on your quiet 
strength.
Jennifer B. Kahnweile.
Oakland, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2018.
BF 637 L4 K27 2018
The leader you want to be: five essential 
principles for bringing out your best self-every 
day.
Amy Jen Su.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2019.
HD 57.7 S8 2019
Nancy Clark's sports nutrition guidebook.
Nancy Clark, MS, RD, CSSD, Sports Nutrition 
Services, LLC, Newton, MA.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2020.
TX 361 A8 C54 2020
Outsmart your smartphone: conscious tech habits 
for finding happiness, balance & connection IRL.
Tchiki Davis PhD.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, 2019.
BF 575 H27 D38 2019
Power and resistance: critical thinking about 
Canadian social issues.
Wayne Antony, Jessica Antony & Les Samuelson, 
editors.
Winnipeg, MB: Fernwood, 2017.
HN 103.5 P67 2017
Public inquiries in Canada: law and practice.
Ronda Bessner & Susan Lightstone.
Toronto, Ontario : Thomson Reuters, 2017.
KE 4765 B47 2017
Research strategies: finding your way through the 
information fog.
William Badke.
Bloomington, IN : iUniverse, Inc., 2017.
Z 710 B23 2017
What color is your parachute?: a practical 
manual for job-hunters and career-changers.
Richard N. Bolles.
Berkeley, CA: Ten Speed Press, 2020.
HF 5383 B56 2020
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
















































For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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NO PRIVACY INTEREST IN TEXT 
MESSAGES ON SEX ASSAULT 
COMPLAINANT’s PHONE
R. v. Phagura, 2019 BCSC 1638
The complainant reported to police 
that she had been sexually assaulted 
by the accused earlier in the day. The 
complainant was the daughter of a 
close family friend and the accused 
was allowing  her to reside in his home while she 
was attending university in Canada. The police 
interviewed the complainant and obtained a 
statement from her. During the interview, a police 
off icer took three photographs capturing 
screenshots of a WhatsApp text message exchange 
between the accused and the complainant. One 
exchange occurred before the alleged sexual 
assault and the other two followed it.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The Crown sought to introduce the 
photographs of the text messages as 
evidence  for the purposes of an 
admission by an opposing party and to 
corroborate the complainant’s statement. The 
accused, however, argued that his s. 8 Charter 
rights had been breached when police obtained the 
photographs of the text message exchange. In his 
view, they ought to be excluded under s. 24(2). 
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy? 
In order to engage s. 8 of the Charter, the accused 
had to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the  subject matter of the search - the electronic 
conversation. The  conversation consisted of text 
messaging through WhatsApp between the accused 
and the complainant. These messages were located 
on the complainant’s phone. In determining 
whether the sender of a  text message sent to and 
located on a recipient’s phone has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, the totality of the 
circumstances must be considered.
Here, Justice Crabtree found the accused had a 
direct interest in the subject matter of the search 
and subjectively expected it to remain private. The 
accused was one of two participants in the 
electronic conversation and authored the text 
messages the Crown sought to introduce. He also 
asked the  complainant to delete  the messages and 
not tell anyone about them. 
However, after reviewing case law, including the 
Supreme Court of Canada judgement in R. v. 
Marakah, 2017 SCC 59, the judge did not find that 
the  accused’s subjective expectation was 
objectively reasonable. He examined three factors 
used in Marakah to assist in determining whether 
an accused’s expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable: (1) the place of the search; (2) the 
nature of the subject matter of the search (its 
capacity to reveal personal information); and (3) the 
ability to regulate, control, and historical use.
The electronic conversation took place on the 
WhatsApp program. The messages sent were 
encrypted, which reduced the ability for anyone, 
other than the two participants of the chat to 
observe the  messages. It was noted that even the 
operators of the WhatsApp program or application 
do not have access to the messages that flow 
through it. As well, unlike a case involving the 
exchange of texts related to illegal activity between 
two willing  participants freely engaged in a 
criminal enterprise  or activity, this case  involved a 
THE TEXTS
Before alleged sexual assault
11:44 pm - 1st Text Message: not reported in case.
Accused requested the complainant delete the 
message prior to the alleged sexual assault taking 
place.
Following alleged sexual assault
The accused told complainant “Don’t tell anyone. 
Your honour will be ruined” and “I will pay for your 
college fees.”
12:13 am - 2nd Text Message: “Please don’t tell 
anything to anyone.”
12:15 am - 3rd Text Message: “Am so sorry.”
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text exchange between the perpetrator (an adult) of 
the alleged offence and the complainant (who was 
residing at the accused’s home while attending 
university). 
In holding that a sender’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy of a text message is not absolute, Justice 
Crabtree stated:
While the social norm is that a text message 
between a sender and a recipient will remain 
private, there are exceptions, as have been 
noted. In other words, the sender does not or 
cannot have absolute confidence that a text 
message will remain private. There is much that 
depends on the circumstances. [para. 54]
In this case, the judge concluded that the accused 
failed to establish a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages sent to the 
complainant:
In these circumstances, what is the reasonable 
expectation of [the accused]? The relationship 
between the two was one of a close family 
friend providing a place to live for [the 
complainant], the daughter of a friend, while 
she was studying in Canada. In light of the 
allegation before the court, it is also one of 
perpetrator of the alleged offence and the 
victim.
The content of [the accused’s] text messages, 
both before and following the alleged events, 
supports the [accused’s] subjective expectation 
of privacy. However, it is only one factor to 
consider when determining whether the 
expectation of privacy was objectively 
reasonable. While it is open to infer that [the 
accused] wished the messages to remain 
private, there is no evidentiary basis to support 
that both [the accused] and [the complainant] 
had similar interests in keeping the messages 
private. On this basis, there is no ability to 
evaluate whether [the accused’s] asserted 
expectation of privacy was in fact reasonable.
...
Here, there is no information to assess whether 
[the accused’s] wish to have the message 
r e m a i n p r i va t e wa s s i m i l a r t o [ t h e 
complainant’s]. This is an important factor in 
determining whether [the accused’s] belief was 
objectively reasonable. [paras. 51-53]
The accused failed to establish an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore 
had no standing  to challenge the admissibility of 
the photographs under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
Arguments
DEFENCE DEFENCE
• The nature of the alleged conversations between
the complainant and the defendant ought to
attract a high degree of privacy, as such
conversations are capable of revealing a great
deal of personal information.
• It is reasonable to assume that messages
between a married man and a young woman are,
by definition, very private in nature.
• A person does not lose control of information due
to the fact another person possesses or can
access the information.
• In the present circumstances, there was nothing
private or biographical in nature that was revealed
in the exchanges between an alleged perpetrator of
a crime and the victim.
• The purpose or intent of the unsolicited exchange
was an effort to secure the silence of the victim.
• The police did not seize the complainant’s phone.
She willingly turned it over in the course of the
investigation.
• The complainant consented to the police
photographing the images of the text message
exchange displayed on her cell-phone.
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Consent?
In the event he was wrong about whether or not the 
accused had an objectively reasonable  expectation 
of privacy, Justice Crabtree  also examined whether 
the police had obtained the photographs of the text 
messages by consent. He noted there was no 
warrant obtained and therefore the onus shifted to 
the Crown to establish, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the  search was authorized by 
law, the law was reasonable, and the search was 
carried out in a reasonable manner. 
Here, the complainant identified and volunteered 
the information contained on her cell phone. “[The 
complainant] could have disclosed the details of 
the text messages between [the  accused] and 
herself, without the intervention of the police 
officer taking the photographs,”  said the judge. “In 
this particular case, the only information that [the 
complainant] provided access to was that which 
[the accused] shared with her. [The complainant’s] 
consent does not operate to permit the  police to 
obtain the electronic information stored on [the 
accused’s] device, only what was sent to her. It 
only  operates to provide information to which 
both [the complainant] and [the accused] have an 
overlapping interest. In this context, it is not 
reasonable for [the accused] to think or expect 
that [the complainant] would not be able to 
consent to provide such information to the police. 
In my view, the consent provided by [the 
complainant] was valid and sufficient for the 
police to obtain copies of the text message 
exchange between the two parties.”
Admissibility - s. 24(2) Charter
Even if the accused’s s. 8 rights had been breached, 
the evidence was nevertheless admissible under s. 
24(2). First, any search occurred prior to the release 
of Marakah. The police officer was acting in good 
faith and reviewed and photographed the text 
message conversations only  once permission was 
received from the victim to do so. Second, the 
impact of any breach on the  accused’s Charter 
protected interests was reduced. The complainant 
provided the information contained in the text 
messages to the police and it could have been 
provided as an admission against interest by an 
opposing party, even if the  photographs were not 
introduced as evidence. As well, the accused was 
not compelled to conscript himself nor where the 
rights of a third party trampled in order to obtain 
the evidence. Finally, the text messages offered 
probative evidence in the prosecution of a serious 
criminal offence. The messages outlined an 
admission of an opposing party and corroborated a 
witness account of what transpired on the evening 
in question. Society has a  significant interest in the 
adjudication of this type of offence on its merits. 
The exclusion of the evidence would have  resulted 
in greater harm to society's confidence in the 
administration of justice than would its admission.
The accused’s application for the  exclusion of 
evidence was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Comments: It must be noted that the 
Ontario Court of Appeal decision R. v. Reeves, 
2017 ONCA 365 relied upon by the trial judge in 
this case has since been overturned by the Supreme 
Court of Canada (2018 SCC 56) at least in relation 
to “third-party” consent with respect to a  shared 
computer.
What’s an Admission by an 
Opposing Party?
“Under the rules of evidence, statements made by 
an accused are admissions by an opposing party 
and, as such, fall  into an exception to the hearsay 
rule.  They are admissible for the truth of their 
contents.  When statements are made by an 
accused to ordinary persons, such as friends or 
family members, they are presumptively admissible 
without the necessity of a voir dire.  It is only where 
the accused makes a statement to a  ‘person in 
authority’, that the Crown bears the  onus of proving 
the voluntariness of the statement as a prerequisite 
to its admission. This, of course, is the confessions 
rule.” - R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20 at para. 20.
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“Statements, including statements made in email 
messages, made by an accused are admissions by 
an opposing party and, as such, fall into an 
exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible 
for the truth of their contents.” - R. v. Douglas, 
2017 NLPC 0816 at para. 13.
“Inculpatory statements made by an accused 
person fall  under an exception to the hearsay rule 
as admissions by an opposing party. They are prima 
facie admissible for the truth of their contents at the 
trial of the accused if the statements were made to 
ordinary civilians. However, statements made to 
persons in authority, such as police  officers, are 
governed by the common law (voluntariness) rule 
and require the Crown to satisfy the Court that the 
statements were made voluntarily.” - R. v. Swampy, 
2015 ABQB 107 at para. 43.
SEARCHING UNDER HOOD OF 
CAR PROPER AS AN INCIDENT 
TO DRUG ARREST
R. v. Stonefish, 2019 ONCA 914
The accused was stopped while 
driving on a highway. The officer 
could not read the vehicle’s licence 
plate number because the plate  light 
was not functional, an offence under 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic  Act. When the accused 
opened the window, the officer could smell the 
odour of burnt marijuana. The accused could not 
produce his driver's licence or any other 
identification but he correctly identified himself. 
He said he  was driving from Winnipeg to Seine 
River First Nation, where he intended to pick up his 
sister and  bring her back to Winnipeg. He advised 
the officer he was driving overnight to avoid getting 
caught driving without a licence.
The accused appeared nervous and the officer 
suspected he was under the influence of marijuana 
because  his eyes were red. When the officer asked 
about the smell of marijuana, the accused said that 
he had smoked some and pointed to a  silver metal 
marijuana grinder in the cup holder of the car. The 
grinder contained a green leafy substance. The 
o f f i ce r a r re s ted the 
accused for possessing a 
controlled substance. 
Upon search, the officer 
found $1,195 in cash in 
the accused’s pocket. She 
also seized a cell phone 
from the driver's seat, 
which was receiving text 
messages and at least 
one call during that time. 
The officer questioned the accused about the 
ownership of the vehicle. The accused said that the 
car belonged to his friend's girlfriend, but then gave 
the officer an incorrect name for the car’s owner.
Another officer then opened the hood of the  car 
and found a package containing 172 grams of 
cocaine in a  ziploc bag. The package was clearly 
visible when the hood was opened. The street value 
of the cocaine was between $11,000 and $18,000.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued that his s. 10(b) right 
to counsel had been breached when the 
officer questioned him about the odour 
of marijuana in his vehicle, and that his 
s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure was violated by the search of the car. The 
judge, however, dismissed the accused’s Charter 
application. With respect to the officer’s question, 
the judge stated:
[T]he officer was entitled to follow-up her 
suspicions concerning the driver’s sobriety by 
asking a question that is the functional 
equivalent in the circumstances of the 
unobjectionable, “have you had anything to 
drink tonight.” In this case, “why does your car 
smell like burnt marijuana?” [The accused’s] 
answer to that question provided ample 
grounds for the officer to proceed with an 
arrest. 
As for the search of the vehicle, the accused argued 
that looking under the hood was not rationally 
connected to his arrest for being in possession of a 
small amount of marijuana and was therefore 
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outside the scope of a lawful search incident to 
arrest.
The judge, however, found the the common law 
power to search incident to arrest extended to the 
accused’s motor vehicle including under its hood. 
The judge found that “it was objectively 
reasonable to search the vehicle for evidence of 
more controlled substances.”  The relatively small 
and unconcealed amount of marijuana initially 
located in the vehicle did not render the search 
unreasonable. The judge concluded that “popping 
the hood of the car to check the engine 
compartment and finding a  suspicious package in 
plain view is not a  search carried out in an 
unreasonable fashion,”
The judge found the accused was in possession of 
the drugs under the hood - he  had the necessary 
knowledge and control - and convictions for 
possessing cocaine for the purposes of trafficking 
and failure to comply with a  recognizance 
followed. The accused was sentenced to 41 months 
imprisonment.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused again argued that 
h i s C h a r t e r r i g h t s w e r e 
breached. In her view, when the 
arresting officer detected the 
smell of marijuana, the situation changed from a 
routine traffic stop under the Highway Traffic Act 
into an active criminal investigation. He submitted 
that the officer should then have immediately 
advised him of his Charter rights and refrained 
from asking questions of him. Thus, the question 
asked: “Why does your vehicle  smell like burnt 
marijuana?” was impermissible. When the officer 
knew that the  accused was not licensed, the 
arresting officer also knew that he  would not be 
driving the car again that night, so that any 
questions concerning his sobriety were no longer 
relevant.
The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s 
submissions:
In our view the [accused] takes too granulated 
an approach to the situation. It was evolving 
and it was not unreasonable for the officer, 
upon smelling the burnt marijuana, to arrest 
the [accused] for possession of a controlled 
substance. Her question was quite natural in 
the circumstances and did not constitute a 
Charter violation. Indeed, she need not have 
asked the question since the answer was 
obvious. [para. 14]
As for the search of the car, it was reasonable. As 
an incident to arrest, the police can search to 
secure evidence related to the  offence for which 
the person was arrested. This can include the 
search of an automobile provided there is a 
reasonable prospect of securing such evidence. 
“Once she arrested the [accused], the officer was 
free to search him and the vehicle incident to the 
arrest,”  said the Court of Appeal. “The fact that 
there was a small amount of marijuana in the  cup 
“Once she arrested the [accused], the officer was free to search him and the vehicle 
incident to the arrest. The fact that there was a small amount of marijuana in the cup 
holder led quite naturally to a search for more marijuana elsewhere in the car. That 
search turned up the cocaine stored in open view that was revealed when the hood was 
opened.”
“Reasonable grounds to suspect means reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is 
not the same thing as reasonable grounds to believe. Both concepts must be grounded 
in objective facts and stand up to independent scrutiny. However reasonable suspicion 
is a lower standard as it engages reasonable possibility rather than probability.”
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holder led quite naturally to a search for more 
marijuana elsewhere in the car. That search turned 
up the cocaine stored in open view that was 
revealed when the hood was opened. This is not a 
case in which the officers were using the Highway 
Traffic Act as a pretext for searching the car, as in 
some of the cases. In this case, the search was not 
particularly intrusive, nor did it cross any Charter 
lines.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Editor’s Note: The law on possessing marihuana has 
changed since the date the facts of this case arose.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
DRUGS FOUND DURING FIRST 
AID TREATMENT ADMITTED 
UNDER s. 24(2) CHARTER
R. v. Pountney, 2019 BCCA 423
The police  were called to attend to a 
restaurant parking lot where an 
individual was in medical distress. 
An officer found a  man lying face up 
in the parking lot in front of the 
restaurant, with his feet on the sidewalk. The man’s 
breathing was shallow and his complexion was 
slightly blue. He was unresponsive to speech and to 
mild pain stimuli. The officer requested paramedics 
attend the scene. In the meantime, the officer 
commenced first aid, trying to determine whether 
the man had suffered an injury. The officer patted 
and squeezed the  man’s body, starting at the head 
and proceeding downwards, looking for signs of 
bleeding, wounds, broken bones, or injured joints. 
When he reached the man’s left leg, the officer 
noticed a bulge on his left ankle. The officer 
examined it, thinking that the ankle might be 
twisted or broken. On squeezing the bulge, the 
officer felt something “crunchy” and heard a 
“wrinkling” sound. He did not know what he  had 
detected, and thought that the man might have 
“caught something” on his ankle. He pulled up the 
leg of the man’s sweatpants and observed that 
something appeared to have been stuffed down the 
man’s sock. He rolled the sock down, and pulled 
out a clear plastic bag that contained three smaller 
bags and a wad of money. The officer suspected 
that the smaller bags contained drugs and that the 
money was proceeds of trafficking.
The officer continued to examine the man for 
injuries. When paramedics arrived, they gave the 
man an injection of naloxone and he regained 
consciousness. The man was not arrested and the 
officer spoke to the man in an effort to identify the 
drugs. The officer also encouraged the man to 
attend at a hospital. The officer treated the matter as 
a “no case seizure”. He confiscated the drugs and 
money but did not complete a  Report to a Justice 
(Form 5.2). No notes were made of the incident. 
Later, his supervising officers strongly encouraged 
him to proceed with charges and the officer did so. 
The bag contained $360 in cash, and the smaller 
bags contained cocaine (29.4 grams of white 
powder), a mixture of heroin and fentanyl (15.3 
grams of small reddish-brown pebbles), and a 
mixture of fentanyl and caffeine (15.1 grams of 
white powder). The accused was charged with three 
counts of possessing a controlled substance for the 
purpose of drug trafficking. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused argued that the seizure of 
the bag and the failure of the police to 
complete a Form 5.2 made the seizure 
unlawful. In his view, his right to be free 
free from unreasonable search and seizure under 
s. 8 of the Charter had been breached and the
evidence was inadmissible under s. 24(2). The 
Crown contended that the failure to complete the 
Form 5.2 was not a violation of the law, but 
conceded that the seizure of the bag violated the 
accused’s rights. The Crown submitted that the 
evidence was nevertheless admissible under s. 
24(2) despite the Charter breach.
The judge found the evidence admissible. First, the 
breach was not the product of bad faith or a 
deliberate  disregard for the accused’s Charter rights. 
The circumstances were fairly unique. The officer 
was in the process of administering first aid to a 
man laying in the parking lot, and came upon the 
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evidence in the  course of treatment. The officer was 
not acting in bad faith. With respect to the Form 
5.2, the only items seized were illegal drugs and 
some cash. Second, the breach was not an invasive 
one, and the evidence seized was real evidence, 
not conscriptive. The failure to file a Form 5.2 
Report did not affect the accused’s ability to 
conduct his defence. Finally, it was in society’s 
interest to have this case adjudicated on its merits. 
Without the  evidence, there  was no case for the 
prosecution.
The accused was convicted on three counts of 
possessing a controlled substance for the purpose 
of trafficking, one count in respect of each cocaine, 
heroin, and fentanyl.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
Although the Crown conceded at 
trial that the  seizure of the drugs 
and the money violated the 
accused’s Charter rights, on 
appeal it took the position that the discovery of the 
bag and its removal from the  accused’s sock formed 
part of a bona fide first aid assessment undertaken 
by the officer and, therefore, was lawful. But Justice 
Groberman, speaking for a unanimous Court of 
Appeal, noted it was not open to the Crown to now 
argue that the seizure was lawful. “A fair reading of 
the evidence and of the trial judge’s ruling 
indicates that once the officer pulled up [the 
accused’s] pant leg and saw that there was 
something stuffed down his sock, there was no 
medical reason to pull the sock down or to 
examine the item that was hidden in it,” said 
Justice Groberman. “The judge’s finding that there 
was a violation of [the accused’s] rights under s. 8 
of the Charter was, therefore, a correct one, and it 
was appropriate that she conduct an analysis 
under s. 24(2).”
Admissibility of Evidence
In assessing whether the  trial judge erred in 
admitting  the evidence, the Court of Appeal 
reviewed the three lines of inquiry under s. 24(2):
• The “seriousness of the state conduct that led 
to the breach”. This involves an evaluation of 
the culpability of the state actor in engaging in 
the conduct leading to the violation. The court 
must consider the extent to which it is 
necessary  to dissociate itself from that conduct. 
Where the state actor has deliberately violated 
Charter  rights or has acted with reckless 
disregard of them, the demand for exclusion of 
evidence will be very  strong. On the other 
hand, where the state actor has acted in good 
faith, or where the conduct has been 
necessitated by extenuating circumstances, the 
breach is more excusable, and the demand for 
exclusion of evidence is attenuated. Courts 
have recognized that, in examining the 
seriousness of state conduct, there will be a 
spectrum, with “good faith” and “bad faith” 
forming the endpoints.
• The “seriousness of the impact of the Charter 
breach on the Charter-protected interests of 
the accused”. Some Charter breaches will 
result in very limited or purely technical 
interference with protected rights, while others 
will be “profoundly intrusive”. 
• The “truth seeking function of the criminal 
trial process”  and the public interest in having 
matters adjudicated on their merits.
 
Application To This Case
The Court of Appeal declined to interfere with the 
trial judge’s conclusions on any of the three lines of 
the s. 24(2) inquiry and her decision to admit the 
evidence was entitled to deference:
“In summary, the judge erred in requiring specific corroboration of all elements of the tip. 
Such corroboration was unnecessary. Rather, what was required was that the police had 
sufficient information to harbour a reasonable suspicion that they were calling a phone 
number attached to a drug trafficking operation.”
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• Police Conduct: The officer was involved in
administering first aid at the time he came
across the drugs. He did not take deliberate
steps to violate  the accused’s rights, nor did
he take advantage of the accused’s situation
with a view to conducting a criminal
investigation. There was no indication of bad
faith. As well, the officer’s removal of the bag
from the accused’s sock during the first aid
examination represented a completely  natural
and understandable reaction to detecting a
bulge. However, it could not be said to have
fully  met the  requirements of a “good faith”
Charter breach because the officer did not
turn his mind to the question of whether the
removal of the  bag constituted a seizure, or
wh e t h e r i t c o m p l i e d w i t h C h a r t e r
requirements. The trial judge’s evaluation that
the officer’s actions were closer to the good
faith end of the spectrum than to the bad faith
end was reasonable in the circumstances.
• Impact on the Accused: This was not a case
where  the police aggressively searched an
individual in the face of his protests, and
forcibly reached into his pockets. The search
in this case took place in the context of a  first
aid examination, in which the accused’s
privacy was already justifiably compromised.
The seizure of the bag had an exceedingly
limited incremental impact on the accused’s
privacy.
• Societal Interest: It is clear that the charges
here  were serious, and that the impugned
evidence was crucial to a full exposure of the
facts.
As for the officer’s failure to complete a Form 5.2 in 
respect of the drug seizure, the trial judge 
adequately considered that the failure to do so had 
no appreciable effect on either the  seriousness of 
the state conduct or on the accused’s Charter-
protected rights.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ARREST BASED ON 
REASONABLE GROUNDS: 
SEARCH REASONABLE
R. v. Chang, 2019 ONCA 924
As a  result of an undercover police 
investigation aimed at combatting 
juvenile prostitution by means of a 
sting operation, an undercover agent 
posed as an underage 15-year-old 
girl. A target of the investigation began 
communicating with the “girl”. In communications 
between the two, the “girl” told the target to attend 
at a particular McDonald’s restaurant and purchase 
a “Happy Meal” when he arrived. The accused 
attended the restaurant but bought a drink when he 
arrived, not a Happy Meal. He then left before the 
“girl” arrived. The  accused was arrested by police 
and he was searched incident to arrest. The 
accused was charged with sex related offences.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused argued that his rights under 
ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter had been 
breached. In his view, although the 
officer had the necessary subjective belief 
to arrest, it was not objectively reasonable. He 
contended that the evidence discovered on a 
search incident to his arrest was therefore 
inadmissible under s. 24(2). The judge rejected the 
accused’s assertion and concluded that the 
arresting officers’ subjective belief in grounds for 
arrest was objectively reasonable. The accused was 
convicted of two charges arising from his attempts 
to purchase sexual services from a young person. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued, in part, that 
the police did not have the 
requisite grounds to arrest him. 
He opined that the trial judge 
failed to consider exculpatory factors that pointed 
away f r om the accu sed a s t he pe r son 
communicating with the undercover agent posing 
as the  “girl”. The fact the accused did not purchase 
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a “Happy Meal” as directed and he left before the 
“girl” arrived were exculpatory factors the accused 
raised. But the Court of Appeal disagreed. It found 
the trial judge applied the correct legal test and 
principles:
While the undercover agent originally told the 
target to purchase a Happy Meal, the target 
responded that he had purchased a drink, not a 
Happy Meal. The information that was 
communicated to the arresting officers on the 
scene at the McDonald’s was that the target had 
purchased a drink. The [accused] in fact had 
purchased a drink while he was inside the 
McDonald’s. Thus, the fact he bought a drink 
rather than a Happy Meal is not exculpatory 
evidence.
The fact that the [accused] walked out of the 
McDonald’s before the “girl” arrived does not 
undermine the probative value of the evidence 
before the trial judge. The [accused] attended at 
the McDonald’s, as directed by the “girl” he 
was there to have sex with, either inside the 
washroom (which the “girl” said she did not 
want) or in his car; he arrived at the specific 
McDonald’s where the “meet” had been set, at 
the time the police expected the target to 
arrive; he was driving a car, as anticipated; he 
was observed on his cellphone as he 
approached the McDonald’s (the target had 
been corresponding through text messages with 
the undercover agent); and he exited the 
McDonald’s after buying a drink there, just as 
the target indicated he had done, by way of a 
text communication to the undercover agent. 
[paras. 6-7]
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
"It is during our darkest moments that 
we must focus to see the light." 
~Aristotle~
GROUNDS FOR ARREST BASED 
ON INFORMER INFO TO BE 
ASSESSED IN TOTALITY
R. v. Dawad, 2019 SKCA 125
A police sergeant assigned to CFSEU 
was responsible for investigating 
criminal organizations and drug 
trafficking. He received information 
from a source handler that a 
confidential informer said a black male named 
“Karbino” was at a certain woman’s residence in 
P r i n c e A l b e r t , “ r e l o a d i n g t h e m ” w i t h 
methamphetamine and cocaine. The informer also 
said that Karbino had access to a firearm and that 
“they” were driving in a newer white Dodge  Ram. 
The sergeant was told the informer had proven 
reliable  in the past and had never been charged 
with lying to police. A database search revealed a 
residential address for the woman identified by the 
informer. A drive-by of the residence showed a 
newer white Dodge Ram pickup truck, bearing an 
Alberta licence parked in the driveway. Police 
placed the residence under surveillance. There was 
no movement observed for about 45 minutes. Then, 
three  black males and an Indigenous female were 
seen to leave the residence, enter the Dodge Ram, 
and drive away with police surveilling it. 
The truck went through a Tim Horton’s drive-
through and then proceeded out of Prince Albert 
travelling west in the direction of Shellbrook, 
Saskatchewan. Surveillance officers now had a 
photograph of Karbino and had been informed that 
a man named Dawad was the registered owner of 
the truck. As the vehicle was surveilled, the police 
sergeant was kept up-to-date. The Dodge stopped at 
a gas station in Shellbrook and a black male, 
believed to be Karbino, exited it from the driver’s 
side and went into the gas station. After the driver 
returned to the truck, it left, travelled northbound 
on a highway and stopped at an Esso station. The 
accused exited the truck from the driver’s side, 
opened its tailgate, removed a jerry can, and filled 
it with fuel. He then placed the jerry can back in 
the truck box, returned to the driver’s seat, and 
continued driving on the  highway. The sergeant 
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then received information from another handler 
that a different informer said three or four black 
males, one named “Karbino”, were on their way to 
Pinehouse or Beauval for the purpose of supplying 
cocaine to the community. The sergeant was also 
told this informer had proven reliable in the past 
and had never been charged with lying to police. 
There was only one secondary highway by  which 
anyone could reach Beauval and Pinehouse by 
road, and the highway the truck was travelling on 
was the only highway by which drivers could 
access this secondary highway.
With this information, the sergeant believed he  had 
the necessary grounds to stop the truck and arrest 
its occupants for possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. He contacted the Beauval 
detachment and asked that a high risk vehicle stop 
be initiated. After the occupant’s were arrested, a 
post-arrest search of the accused’s truck  located 
about 52 grams of crack cocaine in rock form, 
separated into three separate chunks. One chunk 
was found in a plastic bag inside  a knotted sock 
which was stuffed in a discarded Tim Horton’s bag 
on the floor in front of the back passenger seat 
where  Karbino had been seated. The other two 
chunks were found in separate plastic bags hidden 
inside a  discarded rubber boot in the pickup box 
under a tonneau cover. The accused, along with 
Karbino, was charged with possessing cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The accused contended that he was 
unlawfully arrested (s. 9 Charter breach) 
which led to an improper warrantless 
search (s. 8 Charter breach). In his view 
the evidence was inadmissible under s. 24(2).
The judge found that the sergeant directed the 
arrest of the truck’s occupants and therefore it was 
his grounds that required assessment for objective 
reasonableness. The decision to arrest was 
grounded in information provided by two 
confidential informers. As for the credibility  of the 
informers, the judge concluded that because the 
sergeant made the decision to arrest, he did “not 
need to delve into the actual credibility or reliability 
of [the informers].” Rather, what mattered was 
whether it was reasonable for the sergeant to rely 
on the informers as being credible, based on the 
information he knew about them at the time. In 
doing so, the judge considered that neither 
informer was anonymous and both had been found 
by their handlers to have been proven reliable in 
the past. Thus, the  sergeant had no reason to 
question the informers’ credibility. The judge also 
found the information provided was compelling 
(detailed) and much of the information provided by 
the informers had been corroborated. The judge 
held that the accused’s arrest was lawfully made 
under s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. The 
sergeant’s subjective belief that he had reasonable 
grounds to order the immediate arrest of the 
occupants of the truck was objectively reasonable. 
Since the arrest was lawful, there were no Charter 
breaches. Both men were convicted of possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
Among other things, the accused 
argued that the trial judge erred 
in concluding that the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest him. 
In his view, the trial judge was incorrect when he 
said that he did “not need to delve into the actual 
credibility or reliability” of either informer. 
Justice Leurer, delivering the Appeal Court’s 
decision, described the police power of arrest as 
follows:
In order to justify a warrantless arrest pursuant 
to s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the 
arresting officer must have the subjective belief 
that the individual arrested had committed or 
was about to commit an indictable offence, and 
that belief must be objectively reasonable. In 
respect to the second element of the test, it 
must be objectively established that “a 
reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the 
police officer, would have believed that 
reasonable and probable grounds existed to 
make the arrest”. [reference omitted, para. 44]
In this case, Justice Leurer found the trial judge 
erred in not delving into the actual credibility and 
reliability of the two informers. Thus, the Court of 
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Appeal undertook a fresh consideration in 
determining  whether there was an objectively 
reasonable basis for the arrests in the  totality of the 
circumstances. 
Was the information compelling?
“The degree to which a confidential tip is 
compelling is a function of its detail,”  said Justice 
Leurer. Here, the first informer provided a general 
description and the  first name of the person who 
was travelling in a white Dodge Ram. The informer 
also said this person was ‘reloading’ people with 
illicit drugs at a particular woman’s residence  in 
Prince Albert. This informer also provided the 
specific type of drugs that “Karbino” was 
trafficking, and said “Karbino” had access to a 
firearm.
The second informer also provided compelling 
detail. This informer identified the same suspect 
and that at least three black males were travelling 
to Beauval and Pinehouse to provide cocaine to the 
community.”
Was the informer credible?
Although the trial judge erred in holding he did not 
need to delve into the  actual credibility or 
reliability of the informers, the first informer was 
both credible and reliable. His handler testified that 
he had known the informer for “[a]pproximately 
one year at that time” and “had provided 
information to [the handler] more than 20  times”, 
which had led to an unstated number of seizures of 
drugs and stolen property convictions and “several 
vehicle stops”. As well, the informer’s information 
“had been used in more than five judicial 
authorizations at the time” which led to charges 
against numerous people and one conviction had 
been obtained. The handler described the informer 
as having  been “proven reliable” and, although 
having a criminal record, there were no offences 
involving dishonesty. As for the second informer, 
there  was no evidence that would allow their 
credibility to be independently assessed.
Was the information corroborated?
The first informer’s information was corroborated. 
The police saw a black man named Karbino 
travelling in a white Dodge Ram which had been 
parked at the residence in Prince Albert where the 
informer said that Karbino had been reloading 
people with illicit drugs. The second informer’s 
information was also confirmed during police 
surveillance.  Three black males were in the truck, 
one of whom was named Karbino. The Dodge 
truck, as predicted by the  informer, was travelling 
northwest on the only highway from which a motor 
vehicle operator could access the road to Beauval 
or Pinehouse. 
“In order to justify a warrantless arrest pursuant to s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, the 
arresting officer must have the subjective belief that the individual arrested had 
committed or was about to commit an indictable offence, and that belief must be 
objectively reasonable. In respect to the second element of the test, it must be objectively 
established that ‘a reasonable person, standing in the shoes of the police officer, would 
have believed that reasonable and probable grounds existed to make the arrest’.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Debot Criteria
“First, was the information predicting the 
commission of a criminal offence compelling? 
Second, where the information was based on a ‘tip’ 
originating from a source outside the police, was 
that source credible? Finally, was the information corroborated by 
the police investigation prior to making the decision to conduct 
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Putting it all together
Credibi l i ty, compell ing information, and 
corroboration are not separate tests, but are to be 
objectively viewed on the totality  of the 
circumstances. “The objective  reasonableness of 
the belief of the arresting officer must be assessed 
only  against the facts as they presented themselves 
at the time, not the facts as they might have been,” 
said Justice Leurer. “Here, the reasonable basis to 
arrest [the accused] rests on the combination of 
(a)  the existence of two confidential informants, 
the credibility and reliability  of one of which was 
grounded in evidence before the Court, (b)  the 
compelling detail provided by them, (c)  the 
corroboration of information provided by the 
informants, which included the presence of [the 
accused] and others on a highway leading to a 
finite number of destinations, including the two 
small communities where [the second informer] 
indicated the drugs were to be sold, and d)  the 
fact the vehicle was registered to [the accused].”
The accused’s Charter rights were  not violated and 
there was no need to consider whether the 
evidence of the cocaine  should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PURSE SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO 
ARREST UNREASONABLE: 
EVIDENCE EXCLUDED
R. v. Smith, 2019 SKCA 126
The accused was wanted on an arrest 
warrant for possessing stolen property 
and obstruction. She was also under 
surveillance at that time as a person 
of interest because she was the 
girlfriend of the prime suspect in a homicide 
investigation. In furtherance of the homicide 
investigation, the police had obtained a General 
Warrant authorizing them to “covertly remove” any 
mobile device found on the accused and to 
forensically examine it. 
A police officer located the accused along with two 
male companions. He asked them to stop so he 
could speak with them. But they fled. The accused 
and one male were caught. The male was identified 
as her brother and released but he waited around 
anyway. The accused was uncooperative in her 
arrest and police believed she was impaired by 
some drug. The second male, believed to be her 
boyfriend, had hopped a fence and escaped arrest.
The police handcuffed the accused and took her 
purse from her. Her brother asked the arresting 
officers if he could take the purse. The accused also 
told the officers she wanted to deliver the purse to 
her common law partner. The police refused these 
requests. An officer searched the purse at the site of 
the arrest. In it, he located a black camera case. 
W h e n i t wa s o p e n e d , f o u r b a g g i e s o f 
methamphetamine, weighing 2.7 ounces, were 
found. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The officer who opened the accused’s 
purse said he searched it for two reasons. 
First, to locate potential weapons that 
could harm the officer or anyone else. 
And second, to locate the accused’s cell phone 
pursuant to the General Warrant.
What the General Warrant said:
If, upon arrest of: [the accused and five other named 
individuals]
They are found in the possession of a cellular 
telephone(s), a peace officer may:
• Covertly remove the cellular telephone(s) from
their personal property and using established
procedures and/or software written with the
capability of extracting information and data,
forensically examine the cellular telephone(s).
• All information located will examined [sic],
copied, photographed and/or seized accordingly,
before the cellular telephone(s) are returned.
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The judge found the officer’s search of the purse 
unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. In his view, 
the search had not been lawfully  conducted 
incident to arrest. The accused had been separated 
from her purse at the time the police searched it 
and there was no reasonable basis to be concerned 
about officer or public safety. Furthermore, a search 
could not be justified on the basis of a  vague 
concern for safety. And, if the officer had a concern 
about police personnel who would later conduct 
an inventory search at the station, the easy answer 
was to leave the purse with her brother at the scene 
of the arrest. Finally, the police were not likely  to 
find any evidence relating to the offences set out in 
the warrant — possession of stolen property  and 
obstruction — in the purse. As for a search under 
the the General Warrant, the judge found the 
General Warrant only authorized a search of the 
accused’s cell phone if the police came into lawful 
possession of it. The General Warrant did not 
authorize the police to search the purse for the cell 
phone.
The then excluded the methamphetamine as 
evidence under s. 24(2). The police misconduct 
was serious and the s. 8 breach had a significant 
impact on the accused’s Charter rights, considering 
the high expectation of privacy she had in her 
purse. The accused was acquitted of possessing 
methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the trial 
judge, among other things, erred 
in finding that the police did not 
have lawful authority to search 
the accused’s purse incident to her arrest and in 
holding that the General Warrant did not authorize 
a search of the purse for a cell phone. Furthermore, 
the Crown submitted that the judge was incorrect 
to exclude the methamphetamine found in the 
purse from evidence under s. 24(2).
Search Incident to Arrest
The Court of Appeal examined prior precedent 
regarding search incident to arrest and noted the 
following core principles:
• The power of search incident to arrest is an
exception to the general principle that a
warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable
and to the requirement of reasonable grounds to
search.
• The power of search incident to arrest is an
exceptional policing tool and its exercise must
be limited to searches “truly incidental” to the
arrest in question.
• Reviewing courts must consider the motives of
the police  for the timing and place of the arrest
and the relationship in time and place between
the arrest and the search. That is, the search
must be limited to areas and things both
spatially and causally connected to the arrest in
question.
• A search is not incidental to an arrest when the
police are acting for purposes unrelated to the
arrest.
The general framework for a valid search incident 
to arrest requires:
• The individual searched has been lawfully
arrested;
• The search is truly incidental to the arrest in the
sense that it is for a valid law enforcement
purpose related to the reasons for the arrest such
as ensuring the safety of the police and public,
the protection of evidence from destruction at
the hands of the arrestee or others, and the
discovery of evidence which can be used at the
arrestee’s trial; and
• The search is conducted reasonably.
“[T]he power of search incident to arrest is an exception to the general principle that a 
warrantless search is prima facie unreasonable (and therefore in violation of s. 8 of the 
Charter) and to the requirement of reasonable grounds to search.”
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In this case, Justice Caldwell, speaking for the 
Appeal Court, found the question before it was 
whether the search of the accused’s purse was truly 
incidental to her arrest in that it was conducted for 
a valid law enforcement purpose related to the 
purpose of the arrest. 
Here, the  Crown conceded that the search of the 
purse was not conducted for the purpose of 
obtaining or preserving evidence related to the 
reasons for her arrest (ie. the arrest warrant for 
possessing stolen stolen property  and obstruction). 
Rather, the Crown suggested that the search was 
conducted for police and public safety. In the 
Crown’s view, the trial judge erred by concluding 
the police only  had “vague concerns” about officer 
safety. The Crown suggested the totality of the 
evidence contributed to the searching officer’s 
belief that it was reasonable to search the accused’s 
purse for a weapon. This evidence included the 
accused’s efforts to elude police, her abusive and 
aggressive  behaviour towards the arresting officer, 
her demand that she be allowed to give her purse 
to her common law partner, and her appearance of 
being under the influence of a drug. The Court of 
Appeal added that the totality of the circumstances 
also included the accused being handcuffed and 
separated from her purse.
The police power of search incident to arrest has 
been expanded to include a search for items of 
evidence not in the immediate possession of the 
arrestee so police officers can discover and 
preserve  evidence related to the reasons for arrest. 
However, Justice Caldwell was not convinced “the 
expanded power reaches far enough to cover 
searches for the purpose of officer or public 
safety.” 
“That justification does not, on its face, extend to a 
search for items not in the possession of a detainee 
for the purpose  of police or public protection,” 
said Justice Caldwell. “[The existing common law 
doctrine of exigent circumstances] already 
accounts for an arrest scenario where the public or 
other officers might be put at risk ... Under the 
doctrine of exigent circumstances, a police officer 
may already lawfully conduct a search of a 
detainee’s purse incident to an arrest where the 
officer holds a  reasonable  suspicion that such a 
search is necessary  to prevent imminent bodily 
harm or death.”
The Crown tried to offer support for its argument 
that a broad power to search for weapons incident 
to any arrest is justifiable by raising the following 
points:
• Safety  concerns may continue even after an 
arrest and after the detainee has been 
handcuffed;
• When a detainee is taken into custody, the 
concern for officer safety extends to officers and 
detention personnel at the police station;
• Many things have the potential to be used as a 
weapon, including small or sharp objects, and 
the existence of a potential weapon is, on its 
own, a safety risk; and
• A detainee will regain possession of his or her 
belongings, which may include a potential 
weapon, when released from detention.
Justice Caldwell, however, noted these “factors 
speak to matters of officer safety that are far 
removed from the direct arrest-related safety 
“[T]he common law police power to search incident to an arrest does not permit the 
police to do anything more than conduct a frisk or pat-down search of a detainee’s 
person for weapons where the officer holds a reasonable concern that the detainee 
might have a weapon on or about his or her person. However, where the circumstances of 
the case or the initial body search itself reasonably give rise to a weapons-related safety 
concern that warrants a further, more-intrusive search, such a search may be lawfully 
conducted incident to the arrest.”
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concerns.” He rejected the broad proposition 
offered by Crown that “the searching officer need 
only  have a  reasonable concern that the person 
arrested might have something that could 
potentially be used as a weapon.” He added:
[T]he common law police power to search 
incident to an arrest does not permit the police 
to do anything more than conduct a frisk or 
pat-down search of a detainee’s person for 
weapons where the officer holds a reasonable 
concern that the detainee might have a weapon 
on or about his or her person. However, where 
the circumstances of the case or the initial body 
search itself reasonably give rise to a weapons-
related safety concern that warrants a further, 
more-intrusive search, such a search may be 
lawfully conducted incident to the arrest.
Of course, where an individual is arrested for a 
weapons-related offence, the police officer may
—depending on the circumstances—have an 
objectively valid reason for conducting a more 
intrusive or expansive search for weapons 
because there might be “some reasonable 
prospect of securing evidence” related to that 
offence. Regardless, ... when the objective of a 
search incident to arrest is officer or public 
safety, that concern must be tied directly to the 
risk that the detainee might be armed and 
might thereby pose a threat to safety. [reference 
omitted, para. 33]
The Court of Appeal concluded there was no 
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence supporting 
the Crown’s proposition that the police may, for 
general safety reasons, always conduct an intrusive 
search for weapons incident to an arrest. Even 
though a weapons search incident to an arrest 
addresses the valid objective of officer and public 
safety, it must also, in all circumstances, be 
conducted for a valid objective that is truly 
incidental to the  arrest in question. In this case, 
there  was no suggestion that the police believed the 
accused had a weapon in her purse. “Moreover, it 
is hard to conclude the police reasonably believed 
the possibility [the accused’s] purse contained a 
weapon (or an object that might be used as a 
weapon) posed a safety risk to officers or to the 
public, given that they had detained her, 
handcuffed her and separated her from her purse,” 
said Justice Caldwell. He continued:
In the case at hand, once [the accused] had 
been arrested, she no longer had access to her 
purse or, therefore, to any potential weapon it 
contained. By separating [the accused] from 
her purse, the police had reasonably and 
effectively averted any threat to safety the purse
—or [her] access to it—presented in the context 
of the arrest, thereby eliminating the legal basis 
to search it under the common law power of 
search incident to arrest and under the 
common law safety search power (latterly, 
because there could be no imminent threat). 
There are markedly different safety risks 
associated with a detainee who might have a 
weapon hidden on or about his or her person 
versus a purse placed outside a detainee’s 
control or access that might contain a 
potentially harmful object. [para. 37]
And further:
[I]t is important to remember that the common 
law police power to search incident to an arrest 
only permits the police to conduct searches 
that are truly incidental to the arrest in 
question. Here, [the accused] had not been 
arrested on weapons-related offences and, once 
she had been isolated from her purse, any 
concern for safety could no longer be premised 
on whether there might be a potential weapon 
in her purse that she might use against the 
police or the public, or to aid in an escape. At 
that point, on the Crown’s argument, the safety 
concern became whether there might be 
something in the purse that could—
independent of any action on [the accused’s] 
part and independent of her arrest—injure an 
officer or a detention staff member while they 
were going through her purse for inventory 
purposes at the police station.
Looking at the Crown’s argument in that way, 
the principle it puts forward would permit the 
police to search a purse, backpack or other bag 
every time they arrest someone because there is 
always a possibility that something inside items 
like those could harm other officers or 
detention staff. That is, the Crown’s proposition 
is that such a search is necessarily incidental to 
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all arrests where the detainee has a purse, 
backpack or other container that might conceal 
a weapon or an object that could cause harm 
to an officer or detention staff conducting an 
inventory search. [reference omitted, paras. 
51-52]
But, as the Appeal Court noted, an inventory search 
is not a valid objective for a search incident to 
arrest. “The common law power of search incident 
to arrest has not been expanded to allow a blanket 
search of the personal property of a detainee on 
the basis it will inevitably be searched for 
inventory purposes,” said Justice Caldwell:
Aside from that, what the Crown’s argument 
also overlooks is the objective reasonableness 
of the search. In the scenario proffered by the 
Crown, the arresting officer would conduct a 
search of a purse at the arrest scene so as to 
mitigate the risk to other officers and detention 
staff, who will later conduct an inventory 
search of the purse at the police station. In its 
factum, the Crown argued these other officers 
and detention staff may be unaware that there 
could be a weapon or harmful object in the 
purse. I find that premise extremely difficult to 
accept because it implies police services will 
negligently fail to instruct their detention staff 
to be wary of, and to train and equip their 
detention staff to deal with, a known and 
pervasive safety risk inherent to their job 
function. Furthermore, if the safety concern is 
related to sharp objects, which could cause 
injury to the searcher, then it seems 
counterintuitive to me to think that a police 
officer at the scene of the arrest would 
somehow be better positioned than detention 
personnel at the police station to safely search 
through a purse. Intuitively, I would have 
thought that, by searching at the scene of arrest 
in the heat of the moment, the arresting officer 
might actually cause the potential safety risk to 
materialise.
As the Crown asserted, a detainee may pose a 
continuing safety threat to officers or the public 
even though they are handcuffed. This is 
particularly so when the police have reason to 
believe the detainee has a weapon secreted on 
or about his or her body. However, items that 
belong to a detainee but which are no longer in 
the detainee’s possession or within the 
detainee’s grasp are unlikely to pose a 
continuing threat to the safety of officers or the 
public and, where they do not, the police lack 
a reasonable basis to conduct an intrusive 
search for weapons incident to the detainee’s 
arrest. In contextual terms, the factual 
circumstances of [the accused’s] arrest did not 
give rise to a weapons-related safety concern 
that continued after she had been frisked, 
handcuffed and separated from her purse. 
[paras. 44-45]
Application to the Facts
In this case, Justice Caldwell concluded that the 
common law power to search incident to arrest on 
the basis of officer and public safety  did not justify 
the search of the accused’s purse. The  search was 
neither spatially nor causally connected to her 
arrest. “Once the police had handcuffed [the 
accused] and separated her from her purse, the 
search of that purse for items that might affect 
officer or public safety was not truly  incidental to 
her arrest”  said the Appeal Court. “The officer’s 
subjective belief that the purpose of officer and 
public safety would be served by  the search was 
not objectively reasonable  in the circumstances.” 
Moreover, given the existence of the General 
Warrant, the police refusal to allow the accused to 
give her purse to her brother and the officer’s 
secondary purpose to search for and retrieve the 
cell phone, the search was not related to safety 
concerns respecting jail staff. It was noted, 
however, that other circumstances may well justify 
a search of an arrestee’s belongings at the scene of 
and incidental to an arrest. “It is certainly 
conceivable  that a search of a  purse  for safety 
reasons might be found to be lawful in different 
circumstances, but it was not reasonable in the 
“The common law power of search incident to arrest has not been expanded to allow a 
blanket search of the personal property of a detainee on the basis it will inevitably be 
searched for inventory purposes.”
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circumstances at hand,”  said Justice Caldwell. 
Furthermore, he recognized that, depending on the 
circumstances, the search of a purse may be 
justified as a safety search — if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe a detainee’s purse contains 
something dangerous to a police officer or the 
public — or on the basis of exigent circumstances 
(s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code). “Of course, these 
ancillary powers require  a higher level of 
knowledge or suspicion on the part of the police 
than that required under a search incident to 
arrest; but then, the  power to search incident to 
arrest is an extraordinary exception to the general 
principle that a search without warrant is 
unlawful,” said Justice Caldwell. “To put it another 
way, where a search is reasonably necessary  to 
eliminate an imminent threat to the safety of the 
public or the police, or where an officer has a 
reasonable suspicion a search is necessary  to 
prevent imminent bodily harm or death, the police 
already have the power to lawfully conduct the 
search.”
The  General Warrant
Under s. 487.01(1) of the Criminal Code, a judge 
may issue a warrant authorizing a peace officer to 
use any device or investigative technique or 
procedure or do any thing described in the warrant 
that would, if not authorized, constitute an 
unreasonable search or seizure in respect of a 
person or a person's property. The trial judge ruled 
that the General Warrant did not authorize a search 
for the cell phone. The Crown, however, argued the 
General Warrant implicitly, if not expressly, 
authorized the police to covertly seek out and 
remove any mobile device  the accused may have 
had in her possession at the time of her arrest. In 
the Crown’s view, the General Warrant authorized 
two searches: (1) a covert search of the personal 
property of the individuals named in the General 
Warrant and (2), if a cell phone was found therein, 
the covert removal of that device to facilitate  a 
forensic search of the data on it.
The Appeal Court, however, rejected the Crown’s 
submissions and concluded that the General 
Warrant neither expressly authorized the search of 
the accused’s person or her personal property  (it 
did not say that) nor did it implicitly do so.  “On its 
wording, the General Warrant required that the 
police  find [the  accused] “in the possession of a 
cellular telephone(s),” said Justice Caldwell. “In 
my reading of it, this wording supports the trial 
judge’s interpretation of the limits of the authority 
conferred under the General Warrant.” 
s. 24(2) of the Charter
The trial judge’s decision to exclude the evidence 
was upheld.  Although society had a strong interest 
in having this case tried on its merits, the severity of 
the Charter breach and the impact of the breach on 
the accused’s Charter  protected interests both 
favoured the exclusion of the methamphetamine. 
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
OFFICER LIABLE FOR 
WRONGFUL ARREST DESPITE 
TRAINING TO THE CONTRARY
Kosoian v. Société de transport de Montréal, 
2019 SCC 59
The plaintiff, a 38-year-old woman, 
was leaning forward and rummaging 
through her bag as she descended an 
escalator at a Laval subway station. 
She was not holding the escalator’s 
handrail despite a pictogram indicating that the 
handrail should be held. A police officer (acting as 
a transit inspector) saw her, approached her, and 
said, “Careful, you might fall. It’s dangerous. You 
should hold the handrail.” The plaintiff refused to 
hold the  handrail and a heated exchange occurred. 
The officer ordered the plaintiff several times to 
hold the handrail but she refused to comply. When 
she reached the bottom of the escalator, she refused 
to accompany the officer to a room so he could 
ticket her, and she tried to walk away. She was 
physically escorted to a holding room where she 
refused to provide identification. 
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She was handcuffed, forced to sit in a chair and her 
bag was searched. She was subsequently identified, 
and given a statement of offence for disobeying a 
pictogram and hindering police in their duties. 
The plaintiff was acquitted of the offences in a 
Quebec Municipal Court because the judge 
concluded he was not satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was an obligation to 
obey the pictogram. 
Court of Quebec
The plaintiff brought a civil action against 
the police officer who arrested her, the 
city who employed him (Laval), and the 
authority responsible  for the subway 
system (Société de transport de Montréal). She 
argued that her arrest was unlawful and 
unreasonable, and it constituted a fault under 
Quebec civil law. In her view, holding the handrail 
was not an obligation under a by-law, but simply a 
warning, and a reasonable police  officer in the 
same circumstances would not have acted as the 
arresting officer did. She claimed to suffer 
significant psychological stress and humiliation and 
sought $69,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
The plaintiff’s arguments were rejected and her civil 
action was dismissed. In the judge’s view, the  rules 
were clear and their implementation was beyond 
reproach. Further, the officer’s actions were 
exemplary and irreproachable. The plaintiff was not 
unlawfully detained and the officer’s conduct was 
entirely  justified. The plaintiff was the author of her 
own misfortune by refusing to comply with the 
officer’s order and not holding the escalator’s 
handrail. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
Two members of the Court of 
Appeal ruled that the officer did 
not commit a  civil fault by 
ticketing and arresting the 
plaintiff when she refused to identify herself. Failing 
to hold the handrail was a by-law offence, which 
was presumed valid. The officer had been trained 
that holding the handrail was an obligation under a 
by-law and he acted as a  reasonable police officer 
would have done under the same circumstances. 
A dissenting judge, however, found there was no 
obligation imposed under a by-law that required a 
person to comply with the pictogram and hold the 
handrail. First, the pictogram had not been 
approved by the city, a requirement for making a 
by-law offence. Second, the pictogram only 
communicated a warning to hold the handrail, not 
a directive to do so. The dissenting  judge would 
have awarded the  plaintiff $20,000, but reduced it 
to $15,000 after finding she was 25% at fault for 
aggravating the situation by failing to cooperate 
with police. The $15,000 was to be paid by the 
subway authority because it drafted the  by-law, 
trained police officers and prosecuted the plaintiff.
Supreme Court of Canada
I n a u n a n i m o u s 9 : 0 
judgment del ivered by 
Justice Côté, the by-law was 
found not to create an 
offence for failing to hold 
the handrail. The pictogram was only  a warning to 
hold the handrail and communicated advice to be 
careful. It did not impose  an obligation to do so 
and therefore it could not be disobeyed. The officer 






Image attached as an Appendix to 
the judgment.
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offence that did not exist in law. Since there  was no 
legal basis for the actions taken by the  officer, his 
conduct was unlawful. “In short, a reasonable 
police  officer in the same circumstances would 
necessarily have doubted the existence in law of 
the offence and, as a result, would not have 
required [the plaintiff] to identify herself so that 
she could be given a statement of offence,”  said 
Côté. “Such an officer would certainly not have 
arrested her if she refused, but would instead have 
allowed her to continue on her way. I therefore 
conclude that [the  officer] departed from the 
conduct expected of a reasonable police officer by 
grabbing [the plaintiff] in order to prevent her 
from leaving and by taking her to the holding 
room. By acting in that manner, he  made an arrest 
which was unlawful … and which, having regard 
to the context, constituted a civil fault.”
Police Legal Knowledge
In its judgment, the Supreme Court considered the 
obligation of police officers to know and 
understand the law. In doing so, Justice Côté made 
the following comments (references omitted):
• “In a free and democratic society, police officers
may interfere  with the exercise of individual
freedoms only to the extent provided for by law.
Every person can therefore legitimately  expect
that police officers who deal with him or her
will comply with the law in force, which
necessarily requires them to know the statutes,
regulations and by-laws they are called upon to
enforce. Police officers are thus obliged to have
an adequate knowledge and understanding of 
the statutes, regulations and by-laws they have 
to enforce. Police forces and municipal bodies 
have a correlative obligation to provide police 
officers with proper training, including with 
respect to the law in force.” [para. 6] 
• “Police officers are obliged to have an adequate
knowledge and understanding of criminal and
penal law, of the offences they are called upon
to prevent and repress and of the rights and
freedoms protected by the Charters. They also
have an obligation to know the  scope of their
powers and the manner in which these powers
are to be exercised. A police officer whose
application of the law departs from that of a
reasonable police off icer in the same
circumstances commits a civil fault. In this
respect, an officer who arrests someone on the
basis of a non-existent offence may be civilly
liable.” [para. 55]
• “[W]hile police officers are not held to an
obligation of result with regard to knowledge of
the law, the applicable standard is a high one.
Citizens rightly  expect them to have an
adequate knowledge and understanding of the
statutes, regulations and by-laws they are  called
upon to enforce and of the limits of their
authority.” [para. 58]
• “Police officers cannot claim to carry out their
mission — to maintain peace, order and public
security and to prevent and repress crime and
offences under the law and by-laws — without
“As professionals responsible for law enforcement, police officers must be able to 
exercise judgment with respect to the applicable law. They cannot rely blindly on the 
training and instructions given to them, nor can they mechanically follow internal policies, 
directives and procedures or usual police practices.”
“[I]t is well established that police officers cannot avoid personal civil liability simply by 
arguing that they were merely carrying out an order that they knew or ought to have 
known was unlawful. … The same is true of the training and instructions given to police 
officers and of internal police force policies, directives and procedures.”
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h av i n g a n a d e q u a t e k n ow l e d g e a n d 
understanding of the fundamental principles of 
criminal and penal law, of the rights and 
freedoms protected by the Charters and of the 
offences they are called upon to repress, and 
without knowing the limits of their authority. 
[para. 58]
• “The training and instructions given to police 
officers, as well as internal police force policies, 
directives and procedures, must be considered 
in assessing an officer’s conduct, although they 
are not conclusive in themselves. A reasonable 
police officer must know that they do not have 
the force of law.” [para. 59]
• “As profess ionals responsible for law 
enforcement, police officers must be  able to 
exercise judgment with respect to the applicable 
law. They cannot rely blindly  on the training and 
instructions given to them, nor can they 
mechanically follow internal policies, directives 
and procedures or usual police practices.” [para. 
60]
• “[I]t is well established that police officers 
cannot avoid personal civil liability simply by 
arguing that they were merely carrying out an 
order that they knew or ought to have known 
was unlawful. … The same is true of the training 
and instructions given to police officers and of 
internal police force policies, directives and 
procedures.” [para. 61]
• “[P]olice officers are not lawyers and are not 
held to the same standards as lawyers. For 
example, they are not themselves expected to 
carry out thorough research or to engage in 
extensive reflection concerning the subtleties of 
conflicting case law. Moreover, where a 
question of law is controversial, a police officer’s 
conduct should not be found to constitute fault 
insofar as it is based on an interpretation that is 
reasonable and consistent with the training and 
instructions given to the officer.” [para. 62]
• “[T]he expectations that exist for police officers 
remain high. Where there is uncertainty about 
the law in force, it is incumbent on them to 
make the inquiries that are reasonable  in the 
circumstances, for example by suspending their 
activities in order to consult with a prosecutor or 
by rereading the relevant provisions and the 
available documentation. In principle, an error 
will be judged less severely if it is made during 
an emergency response, or in a situation where 
public safety is at stake, rather than in the 
context of a carefully planned operation or the 
routine application of a  by-law. In other words, 
unless the circumstances require immediate 
intervention, it is not appropriate to act first and 
make inquiries later. I note that — even in an 
emergency — the fact that conduct seems 
dangerous to a police officer does not permit the 
officer to presume the existence of an 
offence.” [para. 63]
“[P]olice officers are not lawyers and are not held to the same standards as lawyers. For 
example, they are not themselves expected to carry out thorough research or to engage 
in extensive reflection concerning the subtleties of conflicting case law. Moreover, where 
a question of law is controversial, a police officer’s conduct should not be found to 
constitute fault insofar as it is based on an interpretation that is reasonable and 
consistent with the training and instructions given to the officer.”
“[P]olice officers are not lawyers and are 
not held to the same standards as 
lawyers. For example, they are not 
themselves expected to carry out 
thorough research or to engage in 
extensive reflection concerning the 
subtleties of conflicting case law. 
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• “[P]olice officers sometimes commit a  civil fault
if they act unlawfully, even where their conduct
is otherwise consistent with the training and
instructions they have received, with existing
policies, directives and procedures and with the
usual practices. It is all a matter of context: the
question is whether a  reasonable police  officer
would have acted in the same manner.” [para.
64]
• “[A] police officer’s conduct must be assessed in
light of the law in force at the time of the events.
An officer can hardly be faulted for applying a
provision that was presumed to be  valid,
applicable and operative at the relevant
time.”  (para. 65)
Liability
As for apportioning  liability, Justice Côté found the 
subway authority, the City of Laval, and the police 
officer all liable. The subway authority was at fault 
as the officer’s mandator by designating the officer 
as a transit inspector, and for implementing the 
bylaw and teaching police officers that the 
pictogram imposed an obligation to hold the 
handrail. The City of Laval was liable as the police 
officer’s employer. Since the plaintiff had no legal 
obligation to hold the handrail and was entitled to 
refuse to obey an unlawful order, no apportionment 
of liability was imposed on her. 
The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed, the Quebec 
Court of Appeal’s judgment was set aside, and the 
award of $20,000 in damages set by  the dissenting 
judge in the Quebec Court of Appeal was assessed, 
50% apportioned to the subway authority and 50% 
to the police (the officer involved).
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
‘STEP SIX’ WARRANT 
PROCEDURE UPHELD: 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Dhesi, 2019 ONCA 569
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
once again used “Step Six” of the 
Garofoli procedure, this time in 
upholding the  validity of a  search 
warrant executed at the accused’s 
home. “According to step six, the Crown is entitled 
to rely  on the unredacted version of the ITO to 
justify  the issuance of the warrant, even though 
the  accused does not have access to the 
unredacted version, so long as the court can 
provide the accused with a  judicial summary of the 
redacted portions that is sufficient to make the 
accused aware of the nature of the redacted 
content of the ITO so as to allow the accused to 
challenge the validity  of the warrant,” said the 
Court of Appeal. It dismissed a conviction appeal 
on charges of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing  proceeds of crime 
($20,710).
The warrant had been heavily redacted to protect 
the identity of two confidential informers and the 
Crown conceded that the issuance of the warrant 
could not be justified on the basis of the  redacted 
ITO. The accused was provided a copy of the 
redacted ITO along with a judicial summary of the 
redacted portions which, in the trial judge’s view, 
allowed the accused to meaningfully challenge the 
warrant. Thus, the accused’s right to make full 
answer and defence  under s. 7 of the Charter had 
not been compromised. The trial judge then 
reviewed the contents of the unredacted ITO and 
found there was a sufficient basis upon which to 
grant the warrant. Thus, there was no s. 8 breach 
and the evidence was admissible.
On appeal, the accused argued that his Charter 
rights were breached under s. 7 and 8 and he 
wanted either the evidence excluded and an 
acquittal entered, or a stay of proceedings on the 
charges. But the Court of appeal upheld the trial 
judge’s ruling, finding he identified and applied the 
correct legal principles:
“[A] police officer’s conduct must be 
assessed in light of the law in force at the 
time of the events. An officer can hardly 
be faulted for applying a provision that 
was presumed to be valid, applicable and 
operative at the relevant time.”  
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In applying the legal principles, the trial judge 
referred to the contents of the summary at 
length. He noted several parts of the summary, 
which allowed the accused to make informed 
submissions about the CIs’ credibility (e.g. the 
CI’s involvement in the drug subculture, and 
the involvement in prior cases with the police), 
and the cogency of the CI’s information (e.g. 
some, but not all, of the information was based 
on first-hand knowledge and observation). The 
summary also referred to information which 
had come from other sources and was said to 
corroborate aspects of the CI’s information (e.g. 
the [accused’s] address, and the model of his 
automobile).
In our view, it was open to the trial judge to 
reach the conclusion that the judicial summary, 
combined with the other information available 
to the [accused], put him in a position where 
he could meaningfully challenge the basis 
upon which the warrant issued even though he 
had not seen the unredacted ITO. Step six in 
Garofoli contemplates that an accused will 
have sufficient information as to the nature of 
the information in the ITO to permit meaningful 
submissions even though the specifics of the 
content of the ITO are not available. Step six 
does not envision a summary that will actually 
inform an accused as to the contents of the 
redacted portions of the ITO. That kind of 
summary would seriously compromise the CI’s 
privilege.
Obviously, an accused operating with a 
summary rather than a copy of the full ITO is at 
a disadvantage in attempting to show that the 
warrant should not have issued. The step six 
procedure, however, seeks to balance 
inherently conflicting interests. That balancing 
inevitably puts some limits on the accused that 
are not present in the normal course of 
litigation. Those limits do not amount to a per 
se violation of s. 7. The violation arises only if 
an adequate summary cannot be provided.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Garofoli “Step Six” Procedure
In R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, the Supreme 
Court of Canada outlined a six step procedure that 
can be used in determining the validity of a sealed 
judicial authorization/warrant requiring 
redactions. The procedure permits the Crown to apply to have the 
reviewing judge consider as much of the excised material as is 
necessary to support the search warrant, which the reviewing 
judge may do upon providing the accused with a judicial summary 
of the excised material. “Step Six” is invoked when the redacted ITO 
is insufficient to support reasonable grounds and the issuance of 
the authorization/warrant is in question:
STEP 1: If the Crown objects to disclosure of any of the sealed material, 
an application should be made by the Crown suggesting the nature of the 
matters to be edited and the basis therefor. Only Crown counsel will have 
the affidavit/ITO at this point.
STEP 2: The trial judge should then edit the affidavit/ITO as proposed by 
Crown counsel and furnish a copy as edited to counsel for the accused. 
Submissions should then be entertained from counsel for the accused. If 
the trial judge is of the view that counsel for the accused will not be able 
to appreciate the nature of the deletions from the submissions of Crown 
counsel and the edited affidavit/ITO, a form of judicial summary as to the 
general nature of the deletions should be provided.
STEP 3: After hearing counsel for the accused and reply from the Crown, 
the trial judge should make a final determination as to editing, bearing in 
mind that editing is to be kept to a minimum and applying the factors 
listed above.
STEP 4: After the determination has been made in Step 3, the edited 
affidavit/ITO should be provided to the accused.
STEP 5: If the Crown can support the authorization on the basis of the 
material as redacted, the authorization/warrant is confirmed.
STEP 6: If, however, the redacting renders the authorization 
insupportable, then the Crown may apply to have the trial judge consider 
so much of the excised material as is necessary to support the 
authorization. The trial judge should accede to such a request only if 
satisfied that the accused is sufficiently aware of the nature of the 
excised material to challenge it in argument or by evidence. In this 
regard, a judicial summary of the excised material should be provided if 
it will fulfill that function. It goes without saying that if the Crown is 
dissatisfied with the extent of disclosure and is of the view that the 
public interest will be prejudiced, it can withdraw tender of the evidence 
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The trial judge was satisfied that the 
information the [accused] had allowed him to 
make informed submissions, which would 
direct the trial judge to matters that were 
relevant to the CIs’ credibility and the cogency 
of the information provided to the police. We 
see no basis upon which to interfere with the 
trial judge’s ruling. [para. 9-12]
As for the validity of the warrant, it was upheld. “A 
court reviewing the validity of a  warrant starts 
with the presumption that the warrant – a judicial 
order – was lawfully issued,” said the Appeal 
Court. “The review of the issuing of the warrant is 
limited to a determination of whether there was a 
basis upon which the warrant could properly 
issue.”   It was open to the trial judge to uphold the 
warrant:
The ultimate validity of the warrant depended 
on the contents of the unredacted ITO. The trial 
judge could not, of course, refer to the redacted 
portions of the ITO in explaining why he was 
satisfied that the warrant would issue. His 
reasons consequently may seem somewhat 
cursory. The trial judge did, however, consider 
whether the ITO provided information that was 
germane to the credibility of the CIs, the 
cogency of the information they provided, and 
whether the information they provided was 
corroborated. He ultimately described the CIs’ 
information as “sufficiently current”, “very 
detailed” and confirmed “significant portions” 
by information from other sources. [para. 14]
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
•
“A court reviewing the validity of a 
warrant starts with the presumption that 
the warrant – a judicial order – was 
lawfully issued. The review of the issuing 
of the warrant is limited to a 
determination of whether there was a 
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UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
March 2, 2020    Optional Workshop: March 3, 2020
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
February 7, 2020   
In Person or Webcast Click here.
February 27, 2020   
In Person or Webcast Click here.
April 3, 2020   
In Person or Webcast Click here.
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ONTARIO’s TOP COURT 
PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR 
WARRANT REVIEW 
R. v. Booth, 2019 ONCA 970
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
provided a useful summary of the 
relevant law as it relates to full and 
frank disclosure, amplification and 
material non-disclosure in a search 
warrant application. The Appeal Court found two 
search warrants — one for a residence and one for 
a digital video recorder — should not have been 
issued for lack of reasonable grounds: 
Obviously, it is imperative that 
issuing judges or justices have 
an accurate understanding of 
the material, known facts 
available to the affiant officer. 
If the ITO contains erroneous, 
incomplete, or dishonest 
information relating to known 
information, an issuing judge 
or justice could be misled, 
and provide an authorization 
that should not have been 
provided. To ensure accuracy, 
anyone seeking an ex parte 
authorization, such as a search 
warrant, is required to make full and frank 
disclosure of material facts. This is because an 
ex parte warrant application is not adversarial. 
As a corollary of the privilege of being the only 
party permitted to present evidence in an ex 
parte application, a search warrant affiant bears 
the burden of presenting the facts accurately 
and fairly, from the perspectives of both sides.
Therefore, a search warrant ITO should never 
try to trick its readers, or offer misleadingly 
incomplete recitations of known facts, and the 
affiant officer must not “pick and choose” 
among the relevant facts in order to achieve a 
desired outcome. Nor should the affiant officer 
invite inferences that would not be drawn or a 
conclusion that would not be reached if the 
omitted facts were disclosed.
What, then, is the frame of material information 
that should be included to make full and frank 
disclosure? To answer that question, consider 
what is required to issue a “reasonable and 
probable grounds” search warrant. For such a 
search warrant to issue, the grounds for the 
warrant must be adjudged not only to be 
probable, but reasonable to rely upon. The ITO 
affidavit has to disclose ... a “credibly-based 
probability [that] replaces suspicion”. As a 
result, the frame of material information 
required to achieve full and frank disclosure 
includes all material information that: (a) could 
undercut the probability that the alleged 
offence has been committed; (b) could 
undercut the probability that there is evidence 
to be found at the place of the search; and (c) 
that challenges the reliability 
a n d c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e 
information the affiant officer 
rel ies upon to es tabl ish 
grounds for the warrant.
W h e r e f u l l a n d f r a n k 
disclosure has not been made, 
a reviewing court will correct 
the warrant ITO to achieve full 
and frank disclosure, and then 
determine based on that 
corrected ITO whether the 
warrant could properly have 
issued i f fu l l and f rank 
disclosure had been made. 
“What is involved is an analysis [of the 
corrected ITO] to determine whether there 
remains sufficient reliable information upon 
which the search authority could be grounded”.
Sometimes erroneous information in an ITO 
will be corrected by simply removing it. 
Information that should not have been included 
in the warrant will always be “excised” in this 
way.
Erroneous information that would have been 
appropriate for inclusion in the ITO if presented 
accurately will sometimes be corrected by 
“amplification” so that it can be considered 
during the sufficiency review. Amplification 
entails adding information that should have 
been disclosed in order to give an accurate 
picture or replacing mistakenly inaccurate 
information with accurate information. When 
“[A] search warrant ITO 
should never try to trick its 
readers, or offer misleadingly 
incomplete recitations of 
known facts, and the affiant 
officer must not “pick and 
choose” among the relevant 
facts in order to achieve a 
desired outcome.”
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material information that would hinder a 
finding of reasonable and probable grounds has 
been improperly omitted, the ITO must be 
amplified to include it. However, amplification 
relating to information that could advance the 
warrant application is permissible only if the 
error in not making full and frank disclosure is: 
(1) a “minor, technical error”; and (2) made in 
“good faith”.
Whether the omission satisfies the first of these 
two amplification prerequisites – the “minor 
technical error” requirement – depends on the 
significance and nature of the error.
Errors that have been corrected 
by ampli f icat ion include: 
m i s t a k e n l y a t t r i b u t i n g 
observations to the wrong 
observer; mistaken dates and 
typographical errors; and 
erroneous but unimportant 
errors in the description of the 
source of information.
In contrast, amplification was 
not available for errors that are 
too significant to qualify as 
“minor, technical” errors, 
including: the failure to identify 
properly the target unit in a 
plaza; the failure to include 
information supporting the 
expertise of a police officer; and 
the failure to provide evidence 
supporting the provenance and 
reliability of a document of 
disputed authenticity.
Where the erroneous information cannot be 
corrected because the error is not a “minor, 
technical” one, it is obvious that it must be 
excised in its entirety. This is because the 
uncorrected, erroneous information simply 
cannot be permitted to remain in the ITO, 
thereby providing an inaccurate boost to the 
case for reasonable and probable grounds.
The same is true where an officer has not acted 
in good faith when failing to make full and 
frank disclosure – the second amplification 
prerequisite. Given that amplification is 
confined to “good faith” error correction, it 
follows that by acting in bad faith, an affiant 
officer squanders the opportunity to have 
in ten t iona l ly mis lead ing in fo rmat ion 
considered in its corrected form by the 
reviewing judge. The misleading information 
cannot remain.
In some cases, bad faith on the part of an 
affiant officer can have an even more profound 
effect. Where an affiant officer’s failure to make 
full and frank disclosure is egregious enough to 
“[subvert] the pre-authorization process 
through deliberate non-disclosure, bad faith, 
deliberate deception, fraudulent 
misrepresentation or the like”, a 
c o u r t h a s t h e “ r e s i d u a l 
discretion” to set aside the 
search warrant, even if there 
would have been reasonable 
and probable grounds, had there 
been full and frank presentation 
of the information.
To emphasize, “amplification” is 
to be used to correct “minor, 
technical” errors caused by a 
good faith failure to make full 
and frank disclosure. It is not an 
opportunity during the search 
warrant review for the Crown to 
retroactively add information 
that it could have included in 
support of the warrant but failed 
to do so. To permit this would 
turn the authorization process 
into a sham. [references omitted, 
paras. 54-66]
In this case, the Appeal Court concluded both 
warrants were issued without reasonable grounds 
and therefore the searches were  s. 8 Charter 
breaches. The evidence was excluded, the 
accused’s convictions of nine offences including 
robbery, wounding with a firearm, aggravated 
assault and possessing a loaded firearm were set 
aside and acquittals entered. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“‘[A]mplification’ is to be 
used to correct ‘minor, 
technical’ errors caused by 
a good faith failure to make 
full and frank disclosure. It 
is not an opportunity 
during the search warrant 
review for the Crown to 
retroactively add 
information that it could 
have included in support of 
the warrant but failed to do 
so. To permit this would 
turn the authorization 
process into a sham.”
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JUDGE MAY TAKE CHARTER 
BREACHES INTO ACCOUNT IN 
CRAFTING SENTENCE 
R. v. Kennett, 2019 NBCA 52
 
The accused, along with another 
man, was arrested on the deck of his 
r e s i d e n c e . Th e  p o l i c e h a d 
reasonable grounds to believe stolen 
property was present at the  address 
but did not have  a warrant. The officers peered 
through the windows of the house  and took 
photographs of its inside  from the outside. Then 
they entered the accused’s residence and looked 
into every room. They also searched the cell phone 
seized from the accused. Later, police obtained a 
warrant to search the  residence and seized drugs 
with an approximate street value of $10,130. The 
accused was charged with five drug offences.
  
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The judge concluded that the warrantless 
search of the accused’s residence — 
including peering into the residence and 
taking photographs — and the search of 
his cell phone breached s. 8 of the Charter. The 
judge expunged from the ITO the information 
gathered through these  warrantless searches. 
However, the  judge held the search warrant, which 
resulted in the seizure of the drugs, could have 
been issued even if the information gathered 
through the illegal searches was expunged from the 
ITO. Although she determined the breaches were 
egregious and impacted the Charter protected 
rights of the accused, the judge admitted the  drugs 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of one 
count of possessing a controlled substance and four 
counts of possession for the  purpose of trafficking 
(PPT). He was sentenced to 30 months in jail for 
PPT cocaine (less time served) and concurrent time 
for the remaining charges: PPT methamphetamine 
(24 months), PPT cannabis (10 months), PPT 
methylphenidate (six  months) and possessing 
amphetamine (6 months). 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
sentence, among other things, 
by arguing that his sentence 
ought to have ben reduced by 
six months to remedy the Charter breaches. In his 
view, the trial judge erred by failing to consider the 
misconduct of the state agents during the 
sentencing proceedings. This, he submitted, 
resulted in the imposition of an unfit sentence. The 
Crown, on the other hand, contended that the 
Charter breaches had ben remedied when the 
information obtained from the searches had been 
expunged from the ITO. In the Crown’s opinion, 
nothing more was required and the sentence 
imposed was reasonable and fit. If however, a 
sentence reduction for the police misconduct was 
to be considered then the Crown suggested a 
reduction of no more than three months was 
appropriate.
 
In reviewing R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, the 
Appeal Court noted that a sentence reduction can 
be an appropriate response to a Charter  breach and 
may be addressed as part of the sentencing  process 
under the Criminal Code  as a mitigating 
circumstance. “I am of the view that in the 
circumstances of this case, the sentencing judge 
should have considered the incidents of state 
misconduct during the sentencing proceedings,” 
said Justice Lavigne, speaking for the Court of 
Appeal. And the court disassociating itself from the 
police misconduct by expunging the unlawfully 
obtained information from the ITO did not bar any 
further remedy at the time of passing sentence 
pursuant to sentencing provisions of Criminal Code. 
“The expunging of the ITO did not eliminate the 
need for proper application of the  sentencing 
principles set out in the Code,”  said Justice 
Lavigne. “While I agree  with the Crown’s 
argument that a sentencing judge is not obliged to 
reduce the sentence every time a Charter breach is 
found, it is a factor that should be considered. The 
discretion comes in when deciding whether or not 
this factor will impact the sentence which would 
have otherwise been imposed.”
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The sentencing judge erred by failing to consider 
the state misconduct as a relevant factor in 
sentencing the accused. This resulted in the 
imposition of an unfit sentence. 
A Fit Sentence?
In this case, the Court of Appeal reduced the 
accused’s sentence. In doing so, Justice Lavigne 
emphasized the following:
• A sentencing judge may take into account
Charter breaches while crafting a fit and
proportionate sentence.
• Remedies granted to redress Charter wrongs are
intended to meaningfully vindicate a  claimant's
rights and freedoms.
• The expunging of the ITO, which had no impact
on the trial, was insufficient to remedy the
impropriety of the state actions.
• The more egregious the breach, the more
attention is to be paid to it in determining a fit
sentence.
In agreeing with the trial judge’s determination that 
“the breaches were egregious and impacted the 
Charter protected rights of the accused,” Justice 
Lavigne stated:
This case reflects a casual, cavalier approach to the 
investigation. Without a warrant and without any 
objective indicators pointing to the possibility of 
persons inside [the accused’s] residence, officers 
entered the residence and carried out a search of 
every room, for the stated purpose of confirming 
the residence was unoccupied. One of those 
officers was an RCMP corporal with significant 
experience in law enforcement. In his testimony, 
he said he would do it again and attempted to 
make a case for “exigent circumstances” to justify 
the warrantless entry and warrantless search of the 
cell phone; however, the judge found no exigent 
circumstances justifying the warrantless searches. 
It is no excuse to say the approach he took here is 
one he or other officers would have taken, or that 
it is an accepted practice. If that were so, it would 
simply be indicative of a wider spread systemic 
problem.
The fact the lead investigator testified he would 
repeat his unconstitutional behaviour points 
towards a disregard of an accused’s Charter rights. 
The police conduct represented a serious 
departure from well-established constitutional 
norms; the officers were not operating in unknown 
legal territory. Both a residence and a cell phone 
carry high expectations of privacy.
Section 8 of the Charter guarantees a broad and 
general right to be secure from unreasonable 
searches and seizures which extends at least so far 
as to protect the right of privacy from from 
unjustified state intrusion. Warrantless searches are 
prima facie unreasonable under s. 8. I can only 
conclude the warrantless entry and search of [the 
accused’s] home and his cell phone was carried 
out with indifference for the law and [the 
accused’s] constitutional rights. It may be time to 
remind us all once again of the importance of a 
person’s home for s. 8 purposes and the age-old 
principle of the inviolability of the dwelling-house. 
[reference omitted]
The accused’s sentence appeal was allowed, his 
sentence for PPT cocaine was reduced from 30 
months to 25 months (less time served) and his 
concurrent sentence for PPT methamphetamine 
was reduced from 24 months to 19 months. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“While I agree with the Crown’s argument 
that a sentencing judge is not obliged to 
reduce the sentence every time a Charter 
breach is found, it is a factor that should 
be considered. The discretion comes in 
when deciding whether or not this factor 
will impact the sentence which would have 
otherwise been imposed.”
“It may be time to remind us all once again 
of the importance of a person’s home for 
s. 8 purposes and the age-old principle of
the inviolability of the dwelling-house.”
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“In a free and democratic society, police 
officers may interfere with the exercise of 
individual freedoms only to the extent 
provided for by law. Every person can 
therefore legitimately expect that police 
officers who deal with him or her will 
comply with the law in force, which 
necessarily requires them to know the 
statutes, regulations and by-laws they are 
called upon to enforce. Police officers are 
thus obliged to have an adequate knowledge 
and understanding of the statutes, 
regulations and by-laws they have to 
enforce. Police forces and municipal bodies 
have a correlative obligation to provide 
police officers with proper training, 
including with respect to the law in force.” 
Supreme Court of Canada
Kosoian v. Société de transport de Montréal, 2019 SCC 59 




SEARCH OF CELL PHONE
R. v. L.E., 2019 ONCA 961
The Ontario Court of Appeal has 
ruled that Canada’s Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act ( IRPA ) 
authorized the warrantless search of 
an accused’s cell phone on which 
child pornography was found. The accused, a 
foreign national, had her cell phone seized by an 
officer from the Canada Border Services Agency 
(CBSA). The accused had been subject to a removal 
order from Canada, as her claim for refugee status 
had failed, and she had been arrested and detained 
at the time the cell phone was searched. 
The accused’s cell phone, an LG Nexus, was not 
password protected. The CBSA officer conducting 
the search said she was relying on s. 16(3) of IRPA 
as her authority for the search. Officials were 
looking for evidence that the accused had valid 
passports and had been in communication with her 
husband. She had claimed she did not know her 
husband’s whereabouts, had not spoken to him for 
a year and had no means of contacting him. This 
information would assist CBSA in proving the 
accused was a flight risk and would justify her 
detention pending removal. In the cell phone’s 
contacts list two separate contact names and 
numbers for the accused’s husband under “My 
love” and “My husband’s number” were found. Text 
message conversations with one of the numbers 
had been deleted. Thinking that other information 
relevant for s. 16(3) IRPA purposes may have been 
deleted, the officer turned the LG Nexus phone 
over to a digital forensic  examiner at the CBSA. The 
CBSA digital forensic  examiner was able to locate 
deleted information and, while searching for 
pictures of the accused’s husband, the examiner 
found some photographs which he considered 
child pornography. He stopped his search and 
called the  police. Police obtained a search warrant, 
seized the LG Nexus phone and forensically 
imaged the contents of the LG Nexus phone. The 
BY THE BOOK:
Immigration & Refugee Protection Acy
Evidence relating to identity
s. 16(3) An officer may require or obtain from
a permanent resident or a foreign national 
who is arrested, detained, subject to an 
examination or subject to a removal order, 
any evidence — photographic, fingerprint or otherwise — 




s. 140  (1)  An officer may seize and hold any means of
transportation, document or other thing if the officer 
believes on reasonable grounds that it was fraudulently or 
improperly obtained or used or that the seizure is necessary 
to prevent its fraudulent or improper use or to carry out the 
purposes of this Act.
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police identified 129 images believed to constitute 
child pornography leading to the charges of 
making, distributing and possessing child 
pornography. Convictions for making and 
distributing  child pornography were entered in the 
Ontario Court of Justice  and the accused was 
sentenced to 36 months imprisonment (less credit 
for pre-sentence custody) followed by probation for 
three years. 
On appeal, the accused’s argument, among others, 
that neither s. 16(3) nor s. 140 of IRPA afforded a 
lawful basis for the cell phone search was rejected. 
But Justice Watt, delivering the Court of Appeal’s 
decision, found the CBSA search was authorized by 
law. He noted:
Conduct by state actors which amounts to a 
search or seizure is subject to the requirement 
of reasonableness in s. 8 of the Charter. To be 
reasonable:
i. a search or seizure must be authorized by
law;
ii. the authorizing law must be reasonable;
and
iii. the search must be carried out in a
reasonable manner.
To be authorized by law, the search must be 
authorized by a specific statute or common law 
rule; the search must meet the procedural and 
substantive requirements of the law; and the 
search must not exceed any subject-matter or 
location limits imposed by the law. [references 
omitted, paras. 62-64]
In Justice Watt’s view, the CBSA officer’s search of 
the accused’s cell phone was authorized by ss. 140 
and 16(3) of IRPA:
Section 16(3) of the IRPA gives CBSA officers a 
statutory search power:
An officer may require or obtain from a 
permanent resident or a foreign national 
who is arrested, detained, subject to an 
examination or subject to a removal order, 
any evidence — photographic, fingerprint or 
otherwise — that may be used to establish 
their identity or compliance with this Act.
Section 16(3) imposes procedural and 
substantive limits on the CBSA officer’s search 
power. Under this provision, a CBSA officer 
can conduct a search if:
i. the subject of the search is a
permanent resident or foreign national;
ii. the subject of the search is arrested,
detained, or subject to an examination
or removal order; and
iii. the search is to establish the subject’s
identity or determine compliance with
the IRPA.
But s.16(3) does not limit the subject matter of 
the search. It allows the CBSA officer to obtain 
“any evidence” so long as that evidence is 
obtained to establish the subject’s identity or 
determine compliance with the IRPA.
In my view, s. 16(3) authorized the CBSA 
officer’s search of the [accused’s] cell phone. 
The [accused] was a foreign national; she had 
been arrested and detained and was subject to 
a removal order. The CBSA officers sought 
evidence that the [accused] was attempting to 
contravene her removal order. They sought 
evidence from the LG Nexus cell phone in the 
[accused’s] possession on arrest, to determine 
the [accused’s] compliance (or lack thereof) 
with the IRPA, having information that could 
support a reasonably grounded belief the 
[accused] was obstructing her removal from 
Canada.
...
“To be authorized by law, the search must be authorized by a specific statute or 
common law rule; the search must meet the procedural and substantive requirements of 
the law; and the search must not exceed any subject-matter or location limits imposed by 
the law.” 
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The [accused] told CBSA officers that her 
husband’s phone number was on the LG Nexus 
cell phone. It was open to the officers to infer 
that her cell phone was likely to reveal details 
of the contact between the [accused] and her 
husband relevant to the true state of affairs 
surrounding their entry into Canada and 
attempts to circumvent their removal. [paras. 
67-71]
Since s. 16(3) of IRPA authorized the  search of the 
accused’s cell phone, it was authorized by law. 




R. v. Shomonov, 2019 ONCA 1008
The accused shot himself in the hand 
at an industrial unit he leased. The 
bullet went through the wall of an 
adjacent unit that was occupied by a 
boxing club. People in the boxing 
club heard a loud sound and noticed a hole in the 
wall. Blood was also seen outside the front door of 
the accused’s unit and its door was locked. The 
police were called to the scene, arrived shortly 
thereafter and secured the premises.
The police called the accused’s cell phone. He said 
he was taken to the hospital by his girlfriend and 
was being treated for an injury caused by a  “nail 
gun”. The police went to the hospital to investigate. 
They discovered that the accused told nursing staff 
that he had been a robbery victim and did not want 
the police involved. His girlfriend was contacted 
and said that she had not seen him all day. Police 
also spoke to a doctor who said the accused 
suffered a gunshot wound. Police interviewed the 
accused, questioning him about what happened. 
However, their questioning became confrontational 
and they  accused him of lying to them about the 
cause of his injury. The accused then admitted that 
he recently bought two firearms and that they were 
still inside his unit.
In the meantime, the police were attempting to 
determine if anyone was in the accused’s unit. They 
knocked on the door, but nobody answered. They 
saw fresh footprints in the snow, which they had 
not previously noticed, that led to a locked rear 
door. Concerned that someone might be  in the unit 
and injured, the officer in charge ordered that the 
police conduct a warrantless search. The police 
broke down the door and searched the unit. 
Nobody was inside. However, the police found two 
firearms. A search warrant was obtained and the 
subsequent search also resulted in the  discovery of 
a quantity of marijuana and cash.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The judge found the accused was not 
detained when police first arrived at the 
hospital. There was nothing remarkable 
about the early police questioning; they 
were  simply attempting to determine what 
happened. However, the judge found the  accused 
was detained and his s. 10(b) Charter rights 
triggered when the  police became confrontational 
with him and accused him of lying. His statements 
about the  firearms in his unit were therefore 
obtained in breach of s. 10(b) and were excluded 
under s. 24(2) for the  purpose of proving  the 
accused’s guilt. However, the judge held that the 
information derived from this part of the interview 
could inform the reasonableness of the officers’ 
grounds to conduct a warrantless search.
As for the search of the  accused’s industrial unit, 
the initial, warrantless search was justified on the 
basis of exigent circumstances. “I have no 
hesitation in concluding that the officers had an 
honest and reasonable concern that there could be 
an injured victim inside the unit,”  said the judge. 
“They were not prepared to take a chance by 
waiting for several hours until a search warrant 
could be obtained. In my opinion, in entering unit 
B without a warrant, they made the right decision. 
The fact that the search revealed that there  was no 
injured victim inside the unit does not mean that 
the decision was the wrong one. There was a 
reasonable belief that a person’s safety  could be at 
risk.”  Moreover, even if the warrantless search 
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infringed s. 8, the evidence was admissible under s. 
24(2). As for the search conducted with the 
warrant, it was valid even without the paragraphs in 
the ITO that detailed the accused’s admissions at 
the hospital or the information derived from the 
warrantless search. The accused was convicted on 
two counts of possessing a prohibited firearm, 
careless use of a firearm and possessing marijuana. 
He was sentenced to 19 months’ imprisonment. 
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the two 
searches of his industrial unit 
were  unlawful. The Court of 
Appeal, however, disagreed.
The Warrantless Search
The trial judge accepted the evidence of the police 
officers involved in the warrantless search that they 
had a genuine concern that an injured person 
might still be inside the unit. “The circumstances 
known to the police at the time amply justified the 
warrantless entry into the [accused’s] commercial 
unit,” said the Court of Appeal. “In other words, 
the trial judge did not err in finding that the entry 
was ‘compelled by urgency, calling for immediate 
police  action to preserve evidence, officer safety 
or public safety’ and that ‘taking the time to obtain 
a warrant would pose  serious risk to those 
imperatives’.”
The Search Warrant
The accused submitted that the search warrant was 
invalid because the police improperly relied upon 
the accused’s admissions made following the 
breach to his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter, 
and the fruits of the warrantless search.
The Court of Appeal also dismissed this argument. 
The trial judge made no error in his analysis of the 
validity of the search warrant. Although he excised 
the paragraphs in the ITO referring to the  accused’s 
admissions,he found the balance of the ITO 
provided an abundant basis for the conclusion that 
reasonable grounds existed to permit the issuance 
of the search warrant. Furthermore, the trial judge 
held that if the fruits of the warrantless search were 
also excised the warrant would still be invalid. 
These  findings made by the trial judge that there 
was still a more-than-adequate basis for the 
issuance of the search warrant were reasonable.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
HIGH-RISK TAKEDOWN DURING 
INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION 
JUSTIFIED
R. v. Garland, 2019 ABCA 479
A woman attended her parents’ 
home to get her five year old son. 
She had left him with her parents 
(the Likneses) to enjoy  a sleepover. 
The next morning the woman 
returned to her parents home to pick up her son. 
She arrived to find a bloody scene, the aftermath of 
a vicious attack. But nobody was home. She called 
9-1-1.
When police attended they found a large amount 
of blood throughout the house, mixed with broken 
teeth. Police initiated a major investigation to find 
the Likneses and their grandson. A forensic 
pathologist believed that the amount of blood 
present was indicative of one or more of the victims 
having been seriously injured, but perhaps still 
alive. Police reviewed home and business security 
video. They saw a truck closely resembling the 
unique old truck the accused drove on the Likneses 
street both at 3:10 am and again at 7:45 am. This 
information, and information that the accused had 
a long-standing grudge against Mr. Liknes and a 
router had been disabled - something the accused 
would understand how to do given his expertise - 
took the police to the accused’s family farm.
The officer in charge instructed his officers that if 
they saw the accused leave the  property alone, they 
were to follow him. But if there was more than one 
person in the truck, they were to intercept it and 
Volume 19 Issue 6 ~ November/December 2019
PAGE 38
detain the  occupants. The accused was soon 
observed driving his truck away from the property 
at 6:15 pm. An officer mistakenly thought he saw a 
second person in the vehicle. The vehicle  was 
stopped. At gunpoint, the accused was placed in 
investigative detention at 6:20 pm by an Emergency 
Response Team. He was Chartered and cautioned. 
He was searched for weapons, handcuffed and 
taken to a  police station. At 7:57 pm, while still 
being held in investigative detention, the accused’s 
footwear was seized (DNA from blood of one of the 
victims was subsequently  found on the shoes). At 
10:49 pm, he was formally arrested and charged 
with kidnapping. At 12:11 am the following 
morning, he was also charged with three counts of 
murder. 
Following the  accused’s initial detention,police 
entered without a search warrant in the hope that 
the missing people may still be alive but in need of 
medical assistance. The officer in charge of the 
investigation instructed officers to enter the 
property and search only buildings and receptacles 
that were large enough to conceal a body. During 
the search of the property, the police found a large 
amount of highly incriminating evidence and 
subsequently obtained a warrant to search it.  
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that there was no 
clear nexus between the accused and 
the violent incident at the Liknes’ 
residence. He also maintained that the 
high-risk takedown was excessive for the purposes 
of a detention. In his view, the method of detention 
was more akin to an arrest than a detention. 
The judge found the investigative detention effected 
by police was based on a reasonable suspicion that 
the accused was connected to the disappearance or 
kidnapping  of the three people. Moreover, the 
manner by which the accused was detained by 
police was not unreasonable in the circumstances. 
The extreme violence used to kidnap three people 
during a home invasion justified the  precautions 
taken by the  police. They were ready to ram his 
vehicle and use snipers if necessary. The judge also 
found the length of detention (more than four 
hours) was justified in the circumstances. Thus, 
there  was no s. 9 Charter breach. However, the 
judge ruled the seizure of the accused’s footwear 
while under investigative detention but prior to 
arrest was unreasonable  under s. 8 of the Charter. 
But the judge admitted the footwear as evidence 
under s. 24(2). The accused was convicted of three 
counts of first-degree murder by a jury and he was 
sentenced to imprisonment for life without 
eligibility for parole until he had served 75 years. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused asserted, among 
other things, that his detention 
was arbitrary  because the 
standard of reasonable suspicion 
had not been met. Further, he  submitted that the 
manner of the detention was unreasonable.  
Investigative Detention
The Court of Appeal described the power of 
investigative detention as follows:
The law regarding investigative detention is not 
in dispute; the police may detain a person for 
investigative purposes if there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that person is connected to 
a crime and that the detention is reasonably 
necessary. That reasonable suspicion must be 
based on objectively discernible facts. 
[reference omitted, para. 28]
Reasonable Suspicion
Here, the standard of reasonable suspicion had 
been met:
The [accused] had an abiding grudge against 
Mr. Liknes. He also had an old truck matching 
the description of the truck seen passing by the 
Liknes residence, (40-50 kms from the 
[accused’s] home), at 3:10 on the morning the 
Liknes residence was broken into and the 
family assaulted and kidnapped. The crime was 
facilitated by the router being disabled, 
suggesting the assailant had a considerable 
understanding of computers; the [accused] is a 
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person with such expertise. That, in the 
circumstances of this case, provided the legal 
justification required to place him under 
investigative detention. [para. 32]
Manner of Detention
As for the manner in which the detention 
was carried out, it was reasonable and 
the trial judge’s decision was entitled to 
deference. The precautions taken by the 
police, ready to ram the accused’s vehicle and use 
snipers if necessary, along with wearing body 
armour and having guns drawn, were  not 
inappropriate in the circumstances. There was no 
evidence that the accused was even aware of the 
snipers or the plan to ram his vehicle if necessary. 
The accused’s observations were limited to noting 
that the officers who detained him had their guns 
drawn, were wearing body armour and helmets 
and driving  a fortified police vehicle. “In the 
circumstances of this case, we see  nothing 
offensive about the  manner of the arrest that 
actually occurred, or the contingency plan that 
was not implemented, of which the  [accused] was 
apparently unaware,” said the Court of Appeal. 
Length of Detention
“As to the length of the investigative detention 
before  the appellant was formally charged, (more 
than four hours) the reasonableness of that 
de ten t ion i s to be de te rmined by the 
circumstances of each case, and we find no fault in 
the trial judge’s conclusion that in all of the 
circumstances of this case  that time was not 
unreasonable’” said the Appeal Court. “We note as 
well that the investigative detention ended with 
the formal arrest of the [accused].”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: This case addresses several more 
issues related to police actions taken during this 
investigation. Additional details taken from R. v. 
Garland, 2017 ABQB 189.
PPSC RELEASES ANNUAL 
REPORT
The Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC) 
has released its 2018-2019 Annual Report. The 
report outlines a number of statistics related to the 
activities of the service, including the following.
Dispositions by Charge
Acquittal After Trial 1,577
Conviction After Trial 1,947
Guilty Plea 23,208
Judicial Stay of Proceedings 109
Withdrawn/Crown Stay of Proceeding 43,571
Other (eg. discharge at preliminary hearing/mistrial) 108
Top 10 Federal Statutes
Statute # Charged persons # Charges
CDSA 127,651 98,279
Criminal Code 114,238 96,526





Income Tax Act 1,573 1,263
Excise Tax Act 1,193 862
Customs Act 1,111 936
Cannabis Act 977 722
YCJA 778 771
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Homicide rate for
every 100,000 people living 











Homicides committed with a firearm were down 
for the first time in 5 years.
249 homicides in Canada were committed with 
a firearm, or 2 in every 5 homicides.
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4 out of 5 
victims knew 
their accused.
Indigenous people1 represented 
about 5% of Canada’s total 
population in 2018, yet accounted 
for 22% of homicide victims and 
30% of accused persons.
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1. The term Indigenous is being used in place of Aboriginal for this product. Aboriginal identity is reported by police for the Homicide Survey. Aboriginal identity includes victims and accused persons 
identified as First Nations persons (either status or non-status), Métis, Inuit, or an Aboriginal identity where the Aboriginal group is not known to police. 
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* Total exceeds 100% due to rounding.
The number of gang-related 
homicides decreased after 






















The rate of gang-related 
homicides in 2018 was still 
the 2nd highest rate since 
2005.
1 1





Homicide victims by accused-victim relationship
2. Includes boyfriend, girlfriend, same-sex relationship, extra-marital lover, ex-boyfriend/girlfriend and other intimate relationships. Intimate relationship homicide counts include victims of all ages.
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice and Community 
Safety Statistics, Homicide Survey.
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advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
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rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
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Certificate 
webpage.
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P O L I C E - R E P O R T E D
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Provided a legal framework 
for the legalization and 




exportation of cannabis in 
Canada.
Introduced new 
provisions related to police 
ability to screen drivers for 
drug impairment.
For more cannabis data:
-  Cannabis Stats Hub


































CHANGE IN RATE OF ALL POLICE-REPORTED CANNABIS OFFENCES 




















Possession of illicit or 
over 30 grams of dried cannabis 
(or equivalent) by an adult
Possession of over 5 grams 
of dried cannabis 
(or equivalent) by youth
Possession of cannabis 
for the purpose of selling
21% 18%
12% 10%
For more information, see the full Juristat article: “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2018.”
Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey.
“Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2018,” Juristat, Statistics Canada. 
RATE OF CANNABIS OFFENCES PER 100,000 POPULATION
In the 2 ½ months 
following 
legalization in 2018,
police reported  
1,454 cannabis 
offences 




declined for the 
7th year in a row.
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